1.    “'A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. W. Va. Code, 53-1-1.' Syllabus point 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W. Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).” Syllabus point 1, State ex rel. State Auto Insurance Co. v. Risovich, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498 (1998).

    2.    “'“In determining whether to grant a rule to show cause in prohibition when a court is not acting in excess of its jurisdiction, this Court will look to the adequacy of other available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all economy of effort and money among litigants, lawyers and courts; however, this Court will use prohibition in this discretionary way to correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, constitutional, or common law mandate which may be resolved independently of any disputed facts and only in cases where there is a high probability that the trial will be completely reversed if the error is not corrected in advance.” Syllabus Point 1, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W. Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979).' Syllabus point 1, State ex rel. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 W. Va. 431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995).” Syllabus point 2, State ex rel. State Auto Insurance Co. v. Risovich, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498 (1998).

    3.    “'The prohibition standard set out in Syllabus Point 1 of Hinkle v. Black, 164 W. Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979), permits an original prohibition proceeding in this Court to correct substantial legal errors where the facts are undisputed and resolution of the errors is critical to the proper disposition of the case, thereby conserving costs to the parties and economizing judicial resources.' Syllabus point 1, State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Karl, 190 W. Va. 176, 437 S.E.2d 749 (1993).” Syllabus point 3, State ex rel. State Auto Insurance Co. v. Risovich, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498 (1998).

Per Curiam:

    The petitioners herein, David Davidson, individually, and Davidson Construction ServicesSee footnote 1 ¹ [hereinafter collectively referred to as “Davidson” or “Petitioner Davidson”], request this Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent herein, the Honorable Jay M. Hoke, Judge of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, from enforcing his August 24, 1999, declaratory judgment order. In that order, Judge Hoke determined that certain exclusions contained in Davidson's commercial general liability insurance policies precluded coverage for a contract claim asserted against Davidson by the additional respondents herein, Mary Ellen Loy Mabe and Tommie C. Mabe [hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Mabes” or “Mr. and Mrs. Mabe”], but that such exclusions did not bar recovery for their tort claim. Upon a review of the parties' arguments and the pertinent authorities, we deny the writ of prohibition. Our denial of prohibitory relief is based upon our conclusions that this case does not warrant the exercise of this Court's original jurisdiction and that the alleged errors of law do not merit the issuance of an extraordinary remedy.

    During the pendency of the circuit court proceedings, Davidson filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy,See footnote 4 ⁴ which automatically stayed the Mabes' action against him.See footnote 5 ⁵ The bankruptcy court subsequently lifted the stay of the Mabes' lawsuit to the extent that Davidson's policies of insurance provide coverage for these claims. In response to this ruling, both parties filed motions for declaratory judgment in the circuit court proceedings. By order entered August 24, 1999, the Honorable Jay M. Hoke, Judge of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, determined that various exclusions contained in Davidson's policies of insurance did not preclude coverage for the Mabes' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and, therefore, ordered that portion of the lawsuit to be set for trial.See footnote 6 ⁶ From this ruling of the circuit court, Davidson petitions this Court for prohibitory relief to prevent the circuit court's enforcement of its declaratory judgment order and to quash the trial of the Mabes' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

    Prohibition, much like its companion original jurisdiction writs of mandamus and habeas corpus, is an extraordinary remedy, the issuance of which is usually “reserved for really extraordinary causes.” State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 198 W. Va. 339, 345, 480 S.E.2d 548, 554 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For this reason, the circumstances warranting a writ of prohibition are limited.

        “A writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. W. Va. Code, 53-1-1.” Syllabus point 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W. Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).

Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. State Auto Ins. Co. v. Risovich, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498 (1998) [hereinafter referred to as “State Auto”].

    Having enunciated this standard, we first must determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction of the underlying declaratory judgment action. Syl. pt. 1, State Auto, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 55-13-1 (1941), circuit courts unquestionably have jurisdiction of declaratory judgment proceedings: “[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. . . .” With specific regard to the type of lawsuit involved in the instant controversy, we previously have held that “[a]n injured plaintiff may bring a declaratory judgment action against the defendant's insurance carrier to determine if there is policy coverage before obtaining a judgment against the defendant in the personal injury action where the defendant's insurer has denied coverage.” Syl. pt. 3, Christian v. Sizemore, 181 W. Va. 628, 383 S.E.2d 810 (1989). See also W. Va. Code § 55-13-2 (1941) (“Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.”). Because the circuit court clearly had jurisdiction of the matter complained of herein, prohibition is not appropriate on jurisdictional grounds.

    The second factor to consider in assessing the propriety of prohibitory relief is whether the circuit court exceeded its legitimate powers by rendering its declaratory ruling. Syl. pt. 1, State Auto, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498.

        “'In determining whether to grant a rule to show cause in prohibition when a court is not acting in excess of its jurisdiction, this Court will look to the adequacy of other available remedies such as appeal and to the over-all economy of effort and money among litigants, lawyers and courts; however, this Court will use prohibition in this discretionary way to correct only substantial, clear-cut, legal errors plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, constitutional, or common law mandate which may be resolved independently of any disputed facts and only in cases where there is a high probability that the trial will be completely reversed if the error is not corrected in advance.' Syllabus Point 1, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W. Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979).” Syllabus point 1, State ex rel. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Canady, 194 W. Va. 431, 460 S.E.2d 677 (1995).

Syl. pt. 2, State Auto, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498.See footnote 9 ⁹ Stated otherwise,

        “[t]he prohibition standard set out in Syllabus Point 1 of Hinkle v. Black, 164 W. Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979), permits an original prohibition proceeding in this Court to correct substantial legal errors where the facts are undisputed and resolution of the errors is critical to the proper disposition of the case, thereby conserving costs to the parties and economizing judicial resources.” Syllabus point 1, State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Karl, 190 W. Va. 176, 437 S.E.2d 749 (1993).
Syl. pt. 3, State Auto, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498. See also Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Williams v. Narick, 164 W. Va. 632, 264 S.E.2d 851 (1980) (“'Where prohibition is sought to restrain a trial court from the abuse of its legitimate powers, rather than to challenge its jurisdiction, the appellate court will review each case on its own particular facts to determine whether a remedy by appeal is both available and adequate, and only if the appellate court determines that the abuse of powers is so flagrant and violative of petitioner's rights as to make a remedy by appeal inadequate, will a writ of prohibition issue.' Syl. pt. 2, Woodall v. Laurita, 156 W. Va. 707, 195 S.E.2d 717 (1973).”). Thus, it is apparent that prohibition generally lies to correct only clear-cut or substantial errors of law, which violate a constitutional, statutory, or common law mandate. Syl. pts. 2 & 3, State Auto, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498.

    Applying this standard to the instant proceeding, we conclude that the legal issues raised herein do not come within this rubric of readily-apparent errors of law. Petitioner Davidson has not based his request for relief upon either a constitutional mandate or a statutory provision to demonstrate the wrongfulness of the circuit court's ruling. Neither can it be argued that this controversy is governed by a controlling common law precedent. The primary case upon which the petitioner relies, State Bancorp, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 199 W. Va. 99, 483 S.E.2d 228 (1997) (per curiam), was rendered by this Court as a per curiam decision. As such, it is not binding authority so as to necessitate the issuance of a writ of prohibition to halt a circuit court's deviation therefrom. See State v. Myers, 204 W. Va. 449, 464 n.13, 513 S.E.2d 676, 691 n.13 (1998) (“remind[ing] counsel that per curiam opinions stand alone factually and are not to be cited as precedent”); Weaver v. Ritchie, 197 W. Va. 690, 693 n.10, 478 S.E.2d 363, 366 n.10 (1996) (noting “lack of any precedential value of . . . per curiam opinion[s]” (citations omitted)); Board of Educ. of Mercer County v. Wirt, 192 W. Va. 568, 575 n.10, 453 S.E.2d 402, 409 n.10 (1994) (observing that per curiam opinion “is not binding upon this Court” (citations omitted)); Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W. Va. 197, 201 n.4, 423 S.E.2d 600, 604 n.4 (1992) (explaining that “if rules of law or accepted ways of doing things are to be changed, then this Court will do so in a signed opinion, not a per curiam opinion”). Cf. Syl. pt. 3, in part, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996) (counseling that prohibition does not lie as a substitute for appeal); State ex rel. Maynard v. Bronson, 167 W. Va. 35, 41, 277 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1981) (same); Handley v. Cook, 162 W. Va. 629, 631, 252 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1979) (same). Accordingly, we do not find that the errors of law alleged by Davidson are so egregious as to require correction through the extraordinary remedy of prohibition.See footnote 10 ¹⁰

    Moreover, we conclude that the remaining criteria involved in our decision to grant prohibitory relief do not warrant the issuance of a writ in this case. As we noted above, the errors of law alleged in this case do not rise to the level of substantial issues of constitutional, statutory, or common law. Syl. pts. 2 & 3, State Auto, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498. Thus, the issues which Petitioner Davidson would have us resolve amount to little more than ordinary legal errors, which we typically review by way of appeal, and not in the context of prohibition proceedings: “[i]t is well established that prohibition does not lie to correct mere errors and cannot be allowed to usurp the functions of appeal, writ of error, or certiorari . . . .” Handley v. Cook, 162 W. Va. at 631, 252 S.E.2d at 148 (citations omitted).See footnote 11 ¹¹ See also Syl. pt. 3, in part, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (“Prohibition . . . may not be used as a substitute for [a petition for appeal] or certiorari.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); State ex rel. Maynard v. Bronson, 167 W. Va. at 41, 277 S.E.2d at 722 (“[P]rohibition cannot be substituted for a writ of error or appeal unless a writ of error or appeal would be an inadequate remedy.” (citations omitted)); State ex rel. Casey v. Wood, 156 W. Va. 329, 334-35, 193 S.E.2d 143, 146 (1972) (same); Fisher v. Bouchelle, 134 W. Va. 333, 335, 61 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1950) (same).See footnote 12 ¹² Likewise, we do not find that “the over-all economy of effort and money” warrant extraordinary relief in this case, or that the alleged errors of law would necessarily result in the subsequent reversal of this case so as to require an expedited remedy. Syl. pt. 2, in part, State Auto, 204 W. Va. 87, 511 S.E.2d 498.

                                        Writ Denied.

        In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.

199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996).