Link to original WordPerfect Document here
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 1998 Term
____________
No. 24475
____________
WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,
an Ohio corporation,
Plaintiff below,
v.
FRANK W. BELL, individually, and as
Executor of the Estate of Betty R. Bell,
Defendant below.
______________________________________________________
Certified Questions from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia
Honorable W. Craig Broadwater, Judge
Civil Action No. 3:96-CV-45
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED
______________________________________________________
Submitted:
March 17, 1998
Filed: July 14, 1998
Michael D. Lorensen,
Esq. Russell
R. Marks, Esq.
Bowles, Rice, McDavid,
Hagerstown,
Maryland
Graff & Love,
P.L.L.C. Attorney
for Defendant below
Martinsburg, West Virginia
Attorney for Plaintiff below
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. "Where an
offer of optional coverage is required by statute, the insurer has the burden of proving
that an effective offer was made, and that any rejection of said offer by the insured was
knowing and informed." Syllabus Point 1, Bias v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 179
W.Va. 125, 365 S.E.2d 789 (1987).
2. "When an
insurer is required by statute to offer optional coverage, it is included in the policy by
operation of law when the insurer fails to prove an effective offer and a knowing and
intelligent rejection by the insured." Syllabus Point 2, Bias v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 179 W.Va. 125, 365 S.E.2d 789 (1987).
Per Curiam:See footnote 1 1
The insurance coverage dispute in this
case comes to the Court as a certified question from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia. The District Court has certified a two-part
question to this Court. As discussed below, based upon the factual situation presented by
the District Court, we answer both parts of the question in the negative.
I.
Beginning in May 1990, the defendant below, Frank Bell began purchasing automobile insurance coverage from the plaintiff below, Westfield Insurance Company ("Westfield"). Since 1990, Mr. Bell has maintained single-limit liability coverage of $500,000.00, and underinsured motorist coverage of $100,000.00.
This case involves W.Va. Code,
33-6-31d [1993],See footnote 2 2 a
statute passed by the legislature and made effective on April 10, 1993. That statute
required the insurance commissioner to create a form for insurance companies to follow in
making offers of optional underinsured motorist coverage to new and existing
policyholders. W.Va. Code, 33- 6-31d(c) [1993] required insurance companies to mail
(or otherwise deliver to) all persons who were already policyholders on the effective date
of the statute a copy of the insurance commissioner's form, and the policyholder was to be
allowed 30 days to complete and return the form. If the policyholder failed to return the
form within 30 days, W.Va. Code, 33-6-31d [1993] creates a presumption that the
policyholder received an effective offer of coverage and made a knowing and intelligent
rejection of the offer.
In July 1993, pursuant to W.Va. Code,
33-6-31d, the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner issued "West Virginia
Informational Letter No. 88," and the parties stipulated that Westfield received this
form sometime during or after July 1993. Informational Letter No. 88 specifies the form
that insurance carriers are required to use in making offers of optional uninsured and
underinsured coverage.
In May 1993, between the time W.Va.
Code, 33-6-31d became effective and July 1993 when the Insurance Commissioner issued
Informational Letter No. 88, Westfield mailed the defendant a four-page form offer giving
Mr. Bell the option to purchase underinsured motorist coverage. The form defined
underinsured motorist coverage, allowed the defendant to check a box indicating the level
of coverage he desired, and stated the cost of that coverage.See footnote 3 3 The form indicated that the defendant
could purchase $500,000.00 in underinsured motorist coverage for a price of $50.00 for the
first car, and $49.00 for each car thereafter. The May 1993 form also states that if the
defendant:
FAIL[ED] TO COMPLETE, SIGN AND RETURN THIS
FORM, FAILURE WILL INDICATE TO US THAT YOU HAVE MADE A KNOWING AND INFORMED DECISION TO
RETAIN THE COVERAGES AND LIMITS OF COVERAGE CURRENTLY SHOWN ON YOUR DECLARATIONS PAGE FOR
BOTH UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE AND UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE.
The defendant never completed, signed and returned this form to Westfield. Therefore,
his underinsured motorist coverage remained at $100,000.00, the amount he purchased the
previous years. In 1994 and again in 1995 Westfield mailed Mr. Bell additional forms
suggesting that he could purchase up to $400,000.00 underinsured coverage -- an amount
less than his $500,000.00 liability policy. Mr. Bell failed to return the form in either
year, and thereby retained his $100,000.00 underinsured coverage.
On July 30, 1995, the defendant and his
wife were involved in an automobile accident. The accident resulted in severe injuries to
Mr. Bell, and the death of his wife, Betty Bell. The parties agree that the damages
sustained by Mr. Bell on his own behalf and on behalf of his wife's estate will exceed the
available liability insurance from the tortfeasor.
II.
On July 1, 1996, plaintiff Westfield
filed a declaratory judgment action against Mr. Bell in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia. After discovery by the parties, the District
Court certified the following two-part question to this Court:
When an insurer does not use a form
required by West Virginia Code § 33-6-31d (April 1993), published, but not formally
adopted, by the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner, to offer its insured the same
underinsured motorist coverage limit as his $500,000.00 single limit of liability
insurance, does the insured have $500,000.00 of underinsured motorist coverage by
operation of law or is the insurer permitted to litigate the issue of a commercially
reasonable offer under the Bias decision?
As discussed below, we answer both parts of the question in the negative.
This case concerns whether the insurance
company made a commercially reasonable offer of underinsured motorist coverage to its
policyholder. When a consumer purchases an automobile liability insurance policy in West
Virginia, W.Va. Code, 33-6-31 [1988] requires the insurance carrier to offer the
consumer the option to also purchase underinsured motorist insurance coverage up to the
dollar limits of his liability insurance.See footnote
4 4 In Bias v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 179 W.Va. 125, 365 S.E.2d 789
(1987), we held that the insurance carrier bears the burden of proving that a commercially
reasonable offer of underinsured coverage was made to the consumer. If the insurance
carrier fails to introduce sufficient proof of a commercially reasonable offer, then
underinsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the limits of liability coverage is
automatically included in the insurance policy.
We stated in Syllabus Points 1 and 2 of Bias:
1. Where an offer of optional coverage is
required by statute, the insurer has the burden of proving that an effective offer was
made, and that any rejection of said offer by the insured was knowing and informed.
2. When an insurer is required by statute to offer optional coverage, it is included in the policy by operation of law when the insurer fails to prove an effective offer and a knowing and intelligent rejection by the insured.
We made it clear in Bias that the "commercially reasonable offer" made
by the insurance company must be made "so as to provide the insured with adequate
information to make an intelligent decision. The offer must state, in definite,
intelligible, and specific terms, the nature of the coverage offered, the coverage limits,
and the costs involved." 179 W.Va. at 127, 365 S.E.2d at 791 (citations omitted).
Defendant Bell argues that this case
hinges on W.Va. Code, 33-6-31d [1993], and its requirement that insurance carriers
make a commercially reasonable offer as required by Bias by using a form
"prepared and made available by the insurance commissioner." In this case, the
insurance carrier made an offer in May 1993, one month after W.Va. Code, 33- 6-31d
became effective, but 2 months before the insurance commissioner prepared and made
available the required form. The defendant argues that even though the insurance carrier
did offer the defendant $500,000.00 in underinsured motorist coverage as required by
statute, that offer is invalid because it did not follow the statutorily prescribed form.
We disagree with the defendant's argument.
Our decision in Bias only required that the offer state, "in definite,
intelligible, and specific terms, the nature of the coverage offered, the coverage limits,
and the costs involved." Until July 1993, when the insurance commissioner issued
Informational Letter No. 88, Bias was the only controlling guideline regarding
commercially reasonable offers of coverage required by W.Va. Code, 33-6-31(b).
While an offer of optional coverage had to be made by an insurance company in compliance
with W.Va. Code, 33-6-31d and the insurance commissioner's guidelines after July
1993, we believe that any offer prior to July 1993 is acceptable if within the mandate of Bias.See footnote 5 5
We therefore hold that the fact that the
insurance carrier did not use the form required by W.Va. Code, 33-6-31d [1993] when
that form had not yet been promulgated by the insurance commissioner does not
automatically render an offer invalid and "commercially unreasonable." If the
insurance carrier in this case made a commercially reasonable offer of coverage in accord
with Bias and the policyholder's $500,000.00 limit of liability insurance, the
policyholder does not have $500,000.00 of underinsured motorist coverage by operation of
law. Furthermore, the failure of an insurance carrier to use the prescribed form prior to
July 1993 does not automatically require that a trial be held to determine whether a
commercially reasonable offer was made under Bias.
III.
As indicated above, we answer both
parts of the District Court's question in the negative.
Certified Questions Answered.
Footnote: 1
1 We point out that a per curiam opinion is not legal precedent. See Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W.Va. 197, 201 n.4, 423 S.E.2d 600, 604 n.4 (1992).Footnote: 2
2 W.Va. Code, 31-6-31d [1993] states:an effective offer of the optional coverages described in this section and
that such applicant exercised a knowing and intelligent election or rejection, as the case
may be, of such offer as specified in the form. Such election or rejection shall be
binding on all persons insured under the policy.
(c) Any insurer who has issued a motor
vehicle insurance policy in this state which is in effect on the effective date of this
section shall mail or otherwise deliver the form to any person who is designated in the
policy as a named insured. A named insured shall complete, date and sign the form and
return the form to the insurer within thirty days after receipt thereof. No insurer or
agent thereof is liable for payment of any damages in any amount greater than any limits
of such coverage, if any, provided by the policy in effect on the date the form was mailed
or delivered to such named insured for any incident which occurs from the date the form
was mailed or delivered to such named insured until the insurer receives the form and
accepts payment of the appropriate premium for the coverage requested therein from the
applicant. The contents of a form described in this section which has been signed by any
named insured shall create a presumption that all named insureds under the policy received
an effective offer of the optional coverages described in this section and that all such
named insured exercised a knowing and intelligent election or rejection, as the case may
be, of such offer as specified in the form. Such election or rejection is binding on all
persons insured under the policy.
(d) Failure of the applicant or a named
insured to return the form described in this section to the insurer as required by this
section within the time periods specified in this section creates a presumption that such
person received an effective offer of the optional coverages described in this section and
that such person exercised a knowing and intelligent rejection of such offer. Such
rejection is binding on all persons insured under the policy.
(e) The insurer shall make such forms
available to any named insured who requests different coverage limits on or after the
effective date of this section. No insurer is required to make
such form available or notify any person of the availability of such optional coverages authorized by this section except as required by this section.
Footnote: 3
3 The pertinent information concerning underinsured motorist coverage provided to Mr. Bell in May 1993 on Westfield's form was:Footnote: 4
4 W.Va. Code, 33-6-31(b)[1988] stated, in pertinent part, that every automobile insurance policy:Footnote: 5
5 The defendant's argument focuses on subsequent offers of underinsured motorist coverage made by Westfield. At some point in 1994, Westfield mailed Mr. Bell another form offer of underinsured motorist coverage that complied with the insurance commissioner's Informational Letter No. 88 in all but one respect: the form offered only up to $400,000.00 in coverage, rather than to the full $500,000.00 in coverage required by W.Va. Code, 33-6- 31(b), the amount of his liability coverage. In April 1995, Westfield again made the same offer of only up to $400,000.00 in coverage. Mr. Bell did not return either of these forms to Westfield, thereby indicating his rejection of additional coverage.