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No. 24025
-- State of West
Virginia v. Kristopher G. and Thomas G.
Workman, Chief Justice, concurring:
I concur with
the result reached by the majority. However, in addition to the
direction provided by the majority for remand, I would emphasize
that the most substantial problem in this case appears not to
have even been addressed. These children committed an act of
wanton vandalism indicating some deep-seated source of anger or
psychological problem. An important tenet of our juvenile law has
been to determine the underlying causation of the juvenile
criminal conduct, with the goal of intervening and addressing the
source of the problem.
Pursuant to
West Virginia Code § 49-5-13(a) (1996), regarding granting
probation to a juvenile, "[t]he court, upon its own motion,
or upon request of counsel, may order a psychological examination
of the child." Pursuant to § 49-5-13(b), "[f]ollowing
the adjudication, the court shall conduct the dispositional
proceeding, giving all parties an opportunity to be heard."
The provision specifies as follows:
In disposition
the court shall not be limited to the relief sought in the
petition and shall, in electing from the following alternatives,
consider the best interests of the child and the welfare of the
public:
(1)
Dismiss the petition;
(2)
Refer the child and the child's parent or custodian to a
community agency for needed assistance and dismiss the petition;
(3)
Upon a finding that the child is in need of extra-parental
supervision: (A) Place the child under the supervision of a
probation officer of the court or of the court of the county
where the child has his or her usual place of abode or other
person while leaving the child in custody of his or her parent or
custodian; and (B) prescribe a program of treatment or therapy or
limit the child's activities under terms which are reasonable and
within the child's ability to perform, including participation in
the litter control program established pursuant to section
twenty-five, article seven, chapter twenty of this code, or other
appropriate programs of community service;
(4)
Upon a finding that a parent or custodian is not willing or able
to take custody of the child, that a child is not willing to
reside in the custody of his parent or custodian, or that a
parent or custodian cannot provide the necessary supervision and
care of the child, the court may place the child in temporary
foster care or temporarily commit the child to the state
department or a child welfare agency. The court order shall state
that continuation in the home is contrary to the best interest of
the child and why; and whether or not the state department made a
reasonable effort to prevent the placement or that the emergency
situation made such efforts unreasonable or impossible. Whenever
the court transfers custody of a youth to the department of human
services, an appropriate order of financial support by the
parents or guardians shall be entered in accordance with section
five, article seven of this chapter and guidelines promulgated by
the supreme court of appeals;
(5)
Upon a finding that the best interests of the child or the
welfare of the public require it, and upon an adjudication of
delinquency pursuant to subdivision (1), section four, article
one of this chapter, the court may commit the child to an
industrial home, correctional institution for children, or other
appropriate facility for the treatment, instruction and
rehabilitation of juveniles: Provided, That the court maintains
discretion to consider alternative sentencing arrangements.
Commitments shall not exceed the maximum term for which an adult
could have been sentenced for the same offense. The order shall
state that continuation in the home is contrary to the best
interests of the child and why; and whether or not the state
department made a reasonable effort to prevent the placement or
that the emergency situation made such efforts unreasonable or
impossible;
(6)
Upon an adjudication of delinquency pursuant to subdivision (3)
or (4), section four, article one of this chapter, and upon a
finding that the child is so totally unmanageable, ungovernable
and antisocial that the child is amenable to no treatment or
restraint short of incarceration, commit the child to a
rehabilitative facility devoted exclusively to the custody and
rehabilitation of children adjudicated delinquent pursuant to
said subdivision. Commitments shall not exceed the maximum period
of one year with discretion as to discharge to rest with the
director of the institution, who may release the child and return
him or her to the court for further disposition. The order shall
state that continuation in the home is contrary to the best
interests of the child and why; and whether or not the state
department made a reasonable effort to prevent the placement or
that the emergency situation made such efforts unreasonable or
impossible; or
(7)
After a hearing conducted under the procedures set out in
subsections (c) and (d), section four, article five, chapter
twenty-seven of this code, commit the child to a mental health
facility in accordance with the child's treatment plan; the
director may release a child and return him to the court for
further disposition. The order shall state that continuation in
the home is contrary to the best interests of the child and why;
and whether or not the state department made a reasonable effort
to prevent the placement or that the emergency situation made
such efforts unreasonable or impossible.
We explained
in State ex rel. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human
Resources v. Frazier, 198 W.Va. 678, 482 S.E.2d 663 (1996), that
"[g]eneral jurisdiction over juvenile proceedings is vested
in the circuit courts pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-5-2(a)
(Supp.1996)" and "specific authority to render
decisions regarding the disposition of juveniles is expressly
granted to circuit courts by West Virginia Code § 49-5-13
(Supp.1996)." Id. at 682, 482 S.E.2d at 667. We also
emphasized that "[t]he extent of a circuit court's
discretion in placing juveniles is evidenced by the wide range of
dispositional options available: community-based programs,
rehabilitative facilities, correctional institutions,
extra-parental supervision through probation officers, temporary
shelter placement, or temporary placement with the DHHR."
Id. at 683, 482 S.E.2d at 668.
In State v.
McDonald, 173 W.Va. 263, 314 S.E.2d 854 (1984), we explained that
"[t]he entire tenor of W.Va. Code, 49-5-13, is to provide
substantial flexibility for sentencing of persons who committed
offenses when they were juveniles." See State v. Ball, 175
W.Va. 652, 337 S.E.2d 310 (1985). "We have long recognized
that the purpose of our juvenile law is to promote the
rehabilitation of troubled children, rather than to punish
them." Id.
The majority indicates that the record fails to disclose any particular program of treatment or therapy for these children. On remand, therefore, the lower court should
endeavor to determine underlying problems causing these children to behave in the manner they did and address them through some program of counseling or rehabilitation. Otherwise, we will in all likelihood be dealing with these children as adult criminals when they reach their majority.