PITTSNOGLE, et al. v. WV DEPT. of TRANSPORTATION, No. 31619 (Per Curiam)(McGraw, J., dissenting)(October 22, 2004). Affirming a grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer defendant by the Circuit Court of Berkeley County. Appellants are women with infant children who claimed that travel to a mandatory three-week training course had a discriminatory disparate impact on them. Holding that the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment because the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, because no specific evidence comparing the impact on the protected class with the impact on the non-protected class was presented.

TYLER COUNTY BD. OF EDUC. v. WHITE, No. 31717 (MAYNARD, C.J.)(October 28, 2004). Reversing an order of the Circuit Court of Tyler County, which ruled that the appellant was not unlawfully discriminated against in her terms of employment with the Board of Education, thereby reversing a decision of the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance Board. Holding that under principles of uniformity, the appellant was entitled to the same 261-day employment term as a similarly situated employee. Holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in concluding that once a grievant establishes a prima facie case of lack of uniformity, discrimination and favoritism under W. Va. Code 18A-4-5b and W. Va. Code 18-29-2(m) and (o), the employer may then escape liability by offering a legitimate reason to justify its different treatment of the grievant. Stating, in syllabus point 5, that: "A discrimination claim under W. Va. Code 18-29-2(m) (1992), need only establish that the adverse employment action was neither job related nor agreed to by the employee who brings the claim. Once a claim is established, an employer cannot escape liability by asserting a justification, such as financial necessity, for the discriminatory treatment. To the extent our prior cases hold otherwise, they are expressly overruled."

WADDY v. RIGGLEMAN, et al., No. 31707 (DAVIS, J.)(October 22, 2004). Reversing an order of the Circuit Court of Grant County that granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants following a bench trial in an action seeking specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. Setting forth a de novo standard of review for orders granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law in a bench trial made pursuant to Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Adopting, in syllabus point 2, the doctrine of impracticability: "Under the doctrine of impracticability, a party to a contract who claims that a supervening event has prevented, and thus excused, a promised performance must demonstrate each of the following: (1) the event made the performance impracticable; (2) the nonoccurrence of the event was a basic assumption on which the contract was made; (3) the impracticability resulted without the fault of the party seeking to be excused; and (4) the party has not agreed, either expressly or impliedly, to perform in spite of impracticability that would otherwise justify his nonperformance." Holding that because the evidence of record tends to indicate that the appellees' inability to obtain the needed releases under the contract was brought about by their own neglect, the circuit court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law. Remanding for further proceedings.