SER BOWLING v. GREENBRIER COUNTY COMMISSION, et al., Nos. 30876, 30877 (Per Curiam)(December 2, 2002). Reversing a decision of the Circuit Court of Greenbrier County in an election contest matter arising from the Democratic nomination for a county commission position. Reinstating the election contest decision made by the Greenbrier County Commission. Holding, inter alia, that in light of the statutory ambiguity created by 2002 amendments to WV Code 3-4A-19a, the Commission did not err in counting ballots that lacked poll clerk signatures.

KARLE v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES/MARSHALL UNIVERSITY, No. 30410 (Per Curiam)(December 2, 2002). Affirming an order of the Circuit Court of Cabell County that upheld a grievance board decision affirming the university's decision to deny tenure. Rejecting arguments that appellant was denied procedural due process prior to tenure review, that she was denied due process during tenure review, and that the administrative law judge was clearly wrong to conclude that she was not entitled to tenure.

WARD v. CLIVER, No. 30493 (Starcher, J.)(December 2, 2002). Affirming, on separate grounds, the dismissal of inmate litigation by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. Addressing for the first time the implementation of WV Code 25-1A-4, which authorizes pre-summons dismissal of certain types of civil actions filed by state inmates. Construing the provision narrowly, that while obviously frivolous lawsuits filed by inmates may be dismissed prior to the issuance of process, where there is any reasonable possibility that a lawsuit filed by an inmate, liberally construed, raises a potentially cognizable or colorable claim, the procedures of WV Code 25-1A-4 should not be employed by circuit courts. Where claims are dismissed under this provision, dismissal orders must state the court's reasoning and set forth a specific factual and legal basis for that decision.

FULLER v. RIFFE, No. 30515 (Per Curiam)(December 2, 2002). Reversing an order of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County that set aside a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $60,000, and entered judgment for the defendants as a matter of law. Concluding that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to conclude that a conveyance by the appellant's grandfather six days prior to his death was a sale rather than a gift, thereby entitling the estate to the purchase price.