ROY G. JONES,
Grievant,
v. Docket No. 02-12-322
GRANT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
DECISION
Roy Jones (“Grievant”) initiated this proceeding on September 11, 2002, challenging
the Grant County Board of Education's (“GCBOE”) decision not to accept his resignation
from employment as a principal. Lower level proceedings were waived, and this grievance
was heard at level three by GCBOE on September 24, 2002. The grievance was denied
by letter dated September 27, 2002. Grievant appealed to level four on October 8, 2002,
and a hearing was held in the Grievance Board's office in Elkins, West Virginia, on January
10, 2003. Grievant was represented by counsel, Jessica M. Baker, and Respondent was
represented by counsel, Dennis V. DiBenedetto. This matter became mature for
consideration upon receipt of the parties' fact/law proposals on February 10, 2003.
The following findings of fact are made based upon a preponderance of the credible
evidence of record.
Findings of Fact
1. Grievant has been employed by GCBOE as principal of Petersburg High
School since October of 1999.
2. Since early in his employment, Grievant has been searching for anotherposition closer to where his family lives in Ritchie County.
(See footnote 1)
The superintendent was aware
of this situation and has, in the past, provided letters of recommendation for Grievant.
3. During the summer of 2002, Grievant applied for a position as principal of
Sissonville High School in Kanawha County.
4. Grievant's annual contract of employment with GCBOE begins and ends on
July 15 of each year.
5. On August 8, 2002, Grievant notified Superintendent Marsha Carr-Lambert
that he had been awarded the Sissonville High School position and wished to be released
from his contract with GCBOE. She advised him that she would discuss it with the Board,
but that she would not recommend that his resignation be accepted.
6. Grievant submitted a written letter of resignation to GCBOE on August 20,
2002.
7. On August 27, 2002, GCBOE voted not to accept Grievant's resignation.
8. Sometime in 2001, GCBOE and the superintendent decided that any
resignations submitted after July 15 for the upcoming school year would not be accepted.
This was an informal decision not formally voted upon by the Board.
Discussion
Grievant has the burden of proving each element of his grievance by a
preponderance of the evidence. Procedural Rules of the W. Va. Educ. & State EmployeesGrievance Bd. 156 C.S.R. 1 § 4.21 (2000);
Holly v. Logan County Bd. of Educ., Docket No.
96-23-174 (Apr. 30, 1997);
Hanshaw v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 33-88-
130 (Aug. 19, 1988).
See W. Va. Code § 18-29-6.
Grievant contends that the July 15 cutoff for resignations was selected arbitrarily
and never shared with employees, including himself. He has made no further legal
arguments. Respondent, however, asserts that statutory provisions support its refusal to
allow Grievant to resign just as the school year was beginning, and that its actions were
justified due to its past difficulties of losing valuable employees who could not be quickly
replaced after school is underway. The prior losses of such employees and resultant
disruption of the educational system caused GCBOE to decide upon a date prior to the
start of school by which “late” resignations would be accepted. July 15 was selected, due
to its fiscal implications and the fact that is usually the date upon which contracts begin and
end for each school year.
Respondent contends that, as an employee under a continuing contract, Grievant
could not submit his resignation after the first Monday in April of the preceding school year,
pursuant to the provisions of
W. Va. Code § 18A-2-2(c). Respondent is correct that
W. Va.
Code §18A-2-2(c) governs this situation. That statute provides:
The continuing contract of any teacher shall remain in full force and effect
except as modified by mutual consent of the school board and the teacher,
unless and until terminated: (1) By a majority vote of the full membership of
the board on or before the first Monday of April of the then current year, after
written notice, served upon the teacher, return receipt requested, stating
cause or causes and an opportunity to be heard at a meeting of the board
prior to the board's action thereon; or (2) by written resignation of the teacher
before that date, to initiate termination of a continuing contract. Such
termination shall take effect at the close of the school year in which the
contract is so terminated: Provided, That the contract may be terminated at
any time by mutual consent of the school board and the teacher and that thissection shall not affect the powers of the school board to suspend or dismiss
a principal or teacher pursuant to section eight of this article[.]
Clearly, this provision contemplates that a board of education is only obligated to
accept an employee's resignation if it is submitted before the first Monday in April, and
resignations submitted after that date are within the discretion of the board to accept or
deny. It is well established that county boards of education have broad discretion in
personnel matters, but must exercise that discretion in a manner which is not arbitrary or
capricious.
Dillon v. Wyoming County Bd. of Educ., 177 W. Va. 145, 351 S.E.2d 58
(1986);
Conrad v. Nicholas County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 97-34-388 (Jan. 12, 1998);
Mullins v. Logan County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 94-23-283 (Sept. 25, 1995);
Dodson v.
McDowell County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 93-33-243 (Feb. 15, 1994). Generally, an
action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency did not rely on criteria intended
to be considered, explained or reached the decision in a manner contrary to the evidence
before it, or reached a decision that was so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a
difference of opinion.
See Bedford County Memorial Hosp. v. Health and Human Serv.
,
769 F.2d1017 (4th Cir. 1985);
Yokum v. W. Va. Schools for the Deaf and the Blind, Docket
No. 96-DOE-081 (Oct. 16., 1996). While a searching inquiry into the facts is required to
determine if an action is arbitrary and capricious, the scope of review is narrow, and an
administrative law judge may not simply substitute her judgment for that of the board of
education.
See generally Harrison v. Ginsberg, 169 W. Va. 162, 286 S.E.2d 276 (1982).
While the undersigned is extremely sympathetic to Grievant's personal situation, the
evidence does not support a finding that GCBOE's decision in this case was arbitrary and
capricious. GCBOE's frustration with the disruption to the learning process which iscaused by staff resignations during the school year is quite understandable. If Grievant's
resignation had been accepted, it likely would have taken several months to find a suitable
replacement, leaving the Board in the unenviable position of having a high school with no
principal or having to move other employees into the position temporarily, either of which
would obviously have caused substantial disruption to the operations of that school and
perhaps others. Respondent's position is further supported by the provisions of
W. Va.
Code § 18A-2-2(e), which disqualifies a professional who fails to fulfil his or her contract
from teaching in any other school system in the state for the next ensuing school year.
This provision lends further support to the concept of holding employees to their contracts,
in order to prevent school boards from being forced to try to replace them after school is
underway. Although the parties disagree as to whether GCBOE actually communicated
its decision to use July 15 as the cutoff for late resignations, that would not alter the
outcome here. Pursuant to statute, boards of education have discretion with regard to
resignations submitted after the April deadline, and that discretion has not been abused
in this case.
The following conclusions of law support the decision reached.
Conclusions of Law
1. Grievant has the burden of proving each element of his grievance by a
preponderance of the evidence. Procedural Rules of the W. Va. Educ. & State Employees
Grievance Bd. 156 C.S.R. 1 § 4.21 (2000);
Holly v. Logan County Bd. of Educ., Docket No.
96-23-174 (Apr. 30, 1997);
Hanshaw v. McDowell County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 33-88-
130 (Aug. 19, 1988).
See W. Va. Code § 18-29-6.
2. Pursuant to the provisions of
W. Va. Code §18A-2-2(c), the continuingcontract of a professional employee may only be terminated by mutual consent of the
parties, termination for cause or lack of need, or by resignation of the employee submitted
prior to the first Monday in April of the preceding school year.
3. County boards of education have broad discretion in personnel matters, but
must exercise that discretion in a manner which is not arbitrary or capricious.
Dillon v.
Wyoming County Bd. of Educ., 177 W. Va. 145, 351 S.E.2d 58 (1986);
Conrad v. Nicholas
County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 97-34-388 (Jan. 12, 1998);
Mullins v. Logan County Bd.
of Educ., Docket No. 94-23-283 (Sept. 25, 1995);
Dodson v. McDowell County Bd. of
Educ., Docket No. 93-33-243 (Feb. 15, 1994).
4. The evidence submitted in this case does not demonstrate that Respondent's
refusal to accept Grievant's resignation one week prior to the beginning of the school year
constituted an abuse of discretion or was arbitrary and capricious.
Accordingly, this grievance is DENIED.
Any party may appeal this Decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County or the
Circuit Court of Grant County, and such appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of
receipt of this Decision. W. Va. Code § 18-29-7. Neither the West Virginia Education and
State Employees Grievance Board nor any of its Administrative Law Judges is a party to
such appeal and should not be so named. However, the appealing party is required by
W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(b) to serve a copy of the appeal petition upon the Grievance
Board. The appealing party must also provide the Board with the civil action number so
that the record can be prepared and properly transmitted to the appropriate circuit court.
Date: February 24, 2003 _______________________________
DENISE M. SPATAFORE
Administrative Law Judge
Footnote: 1