v. Docket No. 01-34-581
NICHOLAS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent,
and
VICKIE DILLON,
Intervenor.
|
Factors
|
Grievant
|
Intervenor
|
| Appropriate certification |
1
|
1
|
| Amount of administrative experience |
3
|
1
|
| Course work/Degree Level |
1
|
2
|
| Academic Achievement |
1
|
1
|
| Relevant Specialized Training |
0
|
1
|
| Evaluations |
1
|
1
|
| Other Measures or Indicators |
15
|
20
|
| Totals |
22
|
27
|
It is well settled that county boards of education have substantial discretion in
matters relating to the hiring of school personnel as long as their decisions are in the best
interest of the school, and are not arbitrary and capricious. Dillon v. Bd. of Educ. of County
of Wyoming, 177 W. Va. 145, 351 S.E.2d 58 (1986). Additionally, a county board of
education is free to determine the weight to apply to each of the above-stated factors when
assessing an applicant's qualifications for an administrative position, as long as this
substantial discretion is not abused. Hughes v. Lincoln County Bd. of Educ., Docket No.
94-22-543 (Jan. 27, 1995); Blair v. Lincoln County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 92-22-009
(July 31, 1992).
Once a county board of education reviews the criteria, it has "wide discretion in
choosing administrators . . . ." March v. Wyoming County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 94-55-
022 (Sept. 1, 1994). The standard of review in cases brought by unsuccessful candidates
for administrative posts generally entails an inquiry into whether the criteria set forth in
W. Va. Code § 18A-4-7a were accurately assessed for each applicant; whether favoritism
and/or discrimination played a role in the selection process; and whether flaws in the
process were so significant that the outcome might reasonably have been different. Stover
v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 89-20-75 (June 26, 1989). See Mills v.
Wayne County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 99-50-016 (Feb. 22, 1999). Ultimately, it must bedecided whether the Board abused its considerable discretion in personnel matters, or if
its decision was arbitrary and capricious. See Dillon, supra; Stinn v. Calhoun County Bd.
of Educ., Docket No. 98-07-85 (Aug. 28, 1998); Elkins v. Boone County Bd. of Educ.,
Docket No. 95-03-415 (Dec. 28, 1995); Amick v. Nicholas County Bd. of Educ., Docket No.
95-34-037 (Aug. 23, 1995).
"Generally, an action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency did not rely
on criteria intended to be considered, explained or reached the decision in a manner
contrary to the evidence before it, or reached a decision that was so implausible that it
cannot be ascribed to a difference of opinion. See Bedford County Memorial Hosp. v.
Health and Human Serv., 769 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1985); Yokum v. W. Va. Schools for the
Deaf and the Blind, Docket No. 96-DOE-081 (Oct. 16, 1996)." Trimboli v. Dep't of Health
and Human Resources, Docket No. 93-HHR-322 (June 27, 1997). Arbitrary and capricious
actions have been found to be closely related to ones that are unreasonable. State ex rel.
Eads v. Duncil, 196 W. Va. 604, 474 S.E.2d 534 (1996). An action is recognized as
arbitrary and capricious when "it is unreasonable, without consideration, and in disregard
of facts and circumstances of the case." Eads, supra (citing Arlington Hosp. v. Schweiker,
547 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va. 1982)). "While a searching inquiry into the facts is required to
determine if an action was arbitrary and capricious, the scope of review is narrow, and an
administrative law judge may not simply substitute her judgment for that of a board of
education. See generally, Harrison v. Ginsberg, [169 W. Va. 162], 286 S.E.2d 276, 283
(W. Va. 1982)." Trimboli, supra.
Grievant has not proven the Board violated any statute, policy, rule, or regulation
in assessing the criteria. As previously noted, the Board has wide discretion in mattersinvolving the selection of administrative personnel, and has broad discretion to determine
the weight to be afforded a particular criterion. Christian v. Logan County Bd. of Educ.,
Docket No. 94-23-173 (Mar. 31, 1995). W. Va. Code § 18A-4-7a contemplates that county
boards may look beyond certificates, academic training, and length of experience in
assessing the relative qualifications of the applicants. Alt v. Mineral County Bd. of Educ.,
Docket No. 97-28-015 (Aug. 25, 1997); Anderson v. Wyoming County Bd. of Educ.,
Docket No. 93-55-183 (Sept. 30, 1993). Thus, the fact Superintendent Penix and NCBOE
gave weight to the interview process and the possession of a background in food
management and nutrition for the position of Food Service Director does not render the
selection process flawed.
Grievant claims he is more qualified for the position than the successful applicant,
and his testimony indicated he believed his administrative experience was more important
to the position than the possession of food management skills or nutritional knowledge.
Grievant stated he did not see "what a nutritional background has to do with menus, with
measuring or the oversight of a kitchen cafeteria," and when he reviewed the performance
responsibilities contained in the Job Description, he claimed a background in nutrition
would not benefit the person assigned to the position. Grievant believes the majority of
food information is given to the cooks via in-service training.
The matrix completed by the Superintendent confirms Grievant and the successful
applicant were both qualified for the position. Superintendent Penix decided to give
possession of special knowledge and training applicable to the position and the decision
of the Interview Committee great weight. Superintendent Penix also gave weight to the
fact that a background and course work in food management would soon be required bythe State Board of Education. The Interview Committee unanimously recommended the
selection of Intervenor, and Intervenor Dillon had special training. Superintendent Penix,
after reviewing the qualifications of the applicants and compiling his own matrix,
recommended Intervenor Dillon for the position. There is no evidence Superintendent
Penix ignored any aspects of the applicants' qualifications or experience, or that his
decision was in any way arbitrary and capricious. Given Intervenor Dillon's experience in
food management and nutrition, Superintendent Penix's and the Board's decision cannot
be seen as arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. Additionally, Superintendent
Penix's decision to follow the State's requirements early is not arbitrary and capricious or
unreasonable.
Grievant's allegation about the make-up of the Interview Committee will be briefly
addressed. Grievant stated he believed the interview had gone well, but he "felt" there
might be a bias because he had words with a member of the Interview Committee a year
or so ago. Superintendent Penix testified he saw no bias on the part of any member of the
Interview Committee. The Interview Committee member at issue was not called to testify.
"[M]ere allegations alone without substantiating facts are insufficient to prove a grievance."
Baker v. Bd. of Trustee/W.Va. Univers. - Parkersburg, Docket No. 97-BOT-359 (Apr. 30,
1998). Accordingly, the undersigned Administrative Law Judge does not find the make-up
of the Interview Committee influenced the selection of the successful applicant.
The above-discussion will be supplemented by the following Conclusions of Law.
3. It is well settled that county boards of education have substantial discretion
in matters relating to the hiring of school personnel as long as their decisions are in the
best interest of the school, and are not arbitrary and capricious. Dillon v. Bd. of Educ. of
County of Wyoming, 177 W. Va. 145, 351 S.E.2d 58 (1986).
4. "Generally, an action is considered arbitrary and capricious if the agency did
not rely on criteria intended to be considered, explained or reached the decision in a
manner contrary to the evidence before it, or reached a decision that was so implausible
that it cannot be ascribed to a difference of opinion. See Bedford County Memorial Hosp.
v. Health and Human Serv., 769 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1985); Yokum v. W. Va. Schools forthe Deaf and the Blind, Docket No. 96-DOE-081 (Oct. 16, 1996)." Trimboli v. Dep't of
Health and Human Resources, Docket No. 93-HHR-322 (June 27, 1997). Arbitrary and
capricious actions have been found to be closely related to ones that are unreasonable.
State ex rel. Eads v. Duncil, 196 W. Va. 604, 474 S.E.2d 534 (1996). An action is
recognized as arbitrary and capricious when "it is unreasonable, without consideration, and
in disregard of facts and circumstances of the case." Eads, supra (citing Arlington Hosp.
v. Schweiker, 547 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va. 1982)). " While a searching inquiry into the facts
is required to determine if an action was arbitrary and capricious, the scope of review is
narrow, and an administrative law judge may not simply substitute her judgment for that
of a board of education. See generally, Harrison v. Ginsberg, [169 W. Va. 162], 286
S.E.2d 276, 283 (W. Va. 1982)." Trimboli, supra.
5. Additionally, a county board of education is free to determine the weight to
apply to each of the above-stated factors when assessing an applicant's qualifications for
an administrative position, as long as this substantial discretion is not abused. Hughes v.
Lincoln County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 94-22-543 (Jan. 27, 1995); Blair v. Lincoln County
Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 92-22-009 (July 31, 1992). Once a county board of education
reviews the criteria, it has wide discretion in choosing administrators . . . ." March v.
Wyoming County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 94-55-022 (Sept. 1, 1994).
6. The standard of review in cases brought by unsuccessful candidates for
administrative posts generally entails an inquiry into whether the criteria set forth in W. Va.
Code § 18A-4-7a were accurately assessed for each applicant; whether favoritism and/or
discrimination played a role in the selection process; and whether flaws in the process
were so significant that the outcome might reasonably have been different. Stover v.Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 89-20-75 (June 26, 1989). Ultimately, it must
be decided whether the Board abused its considerable discretion in personnel matters.
See Dillon, supra; Stinn v. Calhoun County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 98-07-85 (Aug. 28,
1998); Elkins v. Boone County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 95-03-415 (Dec. 28, 1995);
Amick v. Nicholas County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 95-34-037 (Aug. 23, 1995).
7. The Board has wide discretion in matters involving the selection of
administrative personnel, and has broad discretion to determine the weight to be afforded
a particular criterion. Christian v. Logan County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 94-23-173 (Mar.
31, 1995). W. Va. Code § 18A-4-7a contemplates that county boards may look beyond
certificates, academic training, and length of experience in assessing the relative
qualifications of the applicants. Alt v. Mineral County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 97-28-015
(Aug. 25, 1997); Anderson v. Wyoming County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 93-55-183 (Sept.
30, 1993).
8. Grievant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
selection criteria of W. Va. Code § 18A-4-7a were not utilized and considered, or that the
decision to award the position to the successful applicant was arbitrary and capricious.
9. Grievant has also failed to demonstrate the selection process was so flawed
that the outcome might reasonably have been different. Stover, supra.
10. Grievant has failed to prove he was more qualified than the successful
applicant.
11. "[M]ere allegations alone without substantiating facts are insufficient to prove
a grievance." Baker v. Bd. of Trustee/W.Va. Univers. - Parkersburg, Docket No. 97-BOT-
359 (Apr. 30, 1998). 12. Grievant has failed to demonstrate the make-up the Interview Committee
affected the selection of the successful applicant.
Accordingly, this grievance is DENIED.
Any party may appeal this decision to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County or to the
Circuit Court of the Nicholas County. Any such appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days
of receipt of this decision. W. Va. Code § 18-29-7. Neither the West Virginia Education
and State Employees Grievance Board nor any of its Administrative Law Judges is a party
to such appeal, and should not be so named. However, the appealing party is required by
W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4(b) to serve a copy of the appeal petition upon the Grievance
Board. The appealing party must also provide the Board with the civil action number so
that the record can be prepared and properly transmitted to the appropriate circuit court.
JANIS I. REYNOLDS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
Dated: January 25 , 2002