On July 24, 1999, Charles A. Barnes (Grievant) submitted this grievance directly
to Level IV, in accordance with
W. Va. Code § 29-6A-4(e)(2), challenging his dismissal by
Respondent West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (WVDOT).
Following a series of continuances, each of which was granted for good cause shown, a
Level IV hearing was conducted in this Grievance Board's office in Charleston, West
Virginia, on December 7, 1999.
(See footnote 1)
WVDOT presented the testimony of Larry Barnhart,
Sheriff of Pleasants County, Ernie Larzo, Employment and Benefits Coordinator in the
Human Resources Division of the Division of Highways (DOH), and Mike Davis, DOH
County Administrator for Pleasants County. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties
made oral closing arguments, waiving written arguments, and this matter became maturefor decision at that time. Consistent with the practice of this Grievance Board, this
disciplinary action has been advanced on the docket.
Grievant was employed by WVDOT as a Transportation Worker I. On June 28,
1999, Jeff Black, Human Resources Director for the Division of Highways, notified Grievant
that he was being dismissed from employment based upon Grievant's incarceration for a
probation violation, as a result of which Grievant was not available for work. R Ex 3.
WVDOT treated Grievant's absence as job abandonment.
In disciplinary matters,
W. Va. Code § 29-6A-6 places the burden of proof on the
employer.
Broughton v. W. Va. Div. of Highways, Docket No. 92-DOH-325 (Dec. 31,
1992). More particularly, the employer has the burden of proving each element of a
disciplinary action by a preponderance of the evidence.
Morrison v. W. Va. Bureau of
Commerce, Docket No. 97-DOL-490 (Jan. 15, 1998). A preponderance of the evidence
is generally recognized as evidence of greater weight, or which is more convincing than
the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.
Miller v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Resources, Docket No. 96-HHR-501 (Sept. 30, 1997);
Petry v. Kanawha County Bd. of
Educ., Docket No. 96-20-380 (Mar. 18, 1997). Where the evidence equally supports both
sides, the employer has not met its burden of persuasion.
Leichliter v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health & Human Resources, Docket No. 92-HHR-486 (May 17, 1993).
Consistent with the foregoing standards, WVDOT established that following his
arrest on May 1, 1997, by the Sheriff of Pleasants County, Grievant pled guilty on July 16,
1997, to the offense of making harassing phone calls in violation of a family protectiveorder, and was sentenced to 12 months in jail, with all jail time after four months
suspended. Grievant was also to remain on unsupervised probation for two years. R Ex
1. As a result of Grievant's four month incarceration, he was dismissed from employment
by WVDOT on August 12, 1997. R Ex 1. Grievant was released from jail on October 25,
1997. Grievant had challenged this dismissal through the grievance procedure for state
employees, and the parties settled the matter, reinstating Grievant to his previous position
on March 2, 1998.
On March 1, 1999, Grievant was arrested for violating his probation by making more
harassing phone calls to his wife. Sheriff Barnhart testimony. On April 9, 1999, Grievant's
probation was revoked by the Circuit Court of Pleasants County, and Grievant was
directed to serve the remainder of his 12-month sentence, with credit for 144 days
previously served. R Ex 3. Grievant's projected release date was October 7, 1999.
(See footnote 2)
Sheriff Barnhart testimony. As authorized under Section 15.8(a) of the Administrative Rule
of the West Virginia Division of Personnel, 143 C.S.R. 1 § 15.8(a) (1998), Grievant
requested a discretionary leave of absence on April 5, 1999. However, this request was
denied, as the employer does not generally grant personal leaves of absence to
employees who are incarcerated. Larzo testimony. Based upon Grievant's extended
unavailability for work, WVDOT took this dismissal action in June 1999. Grievant has been employed by WVDOT for approximately 19 years. Prior to these
absences for criminal violations that were not work-related, Grievant's work performance
had been satisfactory. If this were Grievant's first and only extended absence, WVDOT's
decision to terminate his employment might reasonably be viewed as unduly harsh.
However, Grievant was previously given a second chance by his employer following his
initial extended incarceration and the dismissal action which followed. Approximately one
year later, through his own misconduct, Grievant found himself back in jail, and WVDOT
was required to do without his services for several months.
An essential element of employment is to be on the job when your services are
required.
See Davis v. Veteran's Admin., 792 F.2d 1111, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Whatever
an employer's workload, an extended absence by an employee will tend to disrupt its
operations.
See Johnson v. Defense Logistics Agency, 54 M.S.P.R. 370 (1992). Grievant
did not have sufficient annual leave to cover the extended absence resulting from his
incarceration. Thus, WVDOT had discretion to grant or deny Grievant's request for a
leave of absence from employment for this absence, so long as that discretion was not
exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
In applying an "arbitrary and capricious" standard, a reviewing body applies a
narrow scope of review, limited to determining whether relevant factors were considered
in reaching that decision, and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.
Bowman
Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974);
Harrison v. Ginsberg,
169 W. Va. 162, 286 S.E.2d 276 (1982). Moreover, a decision of less than ideal clarity
may be upheld if the agency's path in reaching that conclusion may reasonably bediscerned.
Bowman,
supra, at 286. Given the length of time Grievant would be off the job,
and the fact that a previous extended absence and dismissal for the same reason had
been compromised to allow Grievant to return to work, WVDOT refused to approve a leave
of absence in this instance. Grievant did not demonstrate that WVDOT routinely grants
such requests by other employees in similar circumstances. Accordingly, WVDOT's
determination that Grievant's absence should not be excused is not arbitrary and
capricious, or an abuse of the agency's discretion in making such determinations.
In addition to the foregoing discussion, the following findings of fact and conclusions
of law are appropriate in this matter.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Grievant was employed by the West Virginia Department of Transportation,
Division of Highways (WVDOT) as a Transportation Worker I for approximately 19 years.
2. Grievant was arrested by the Sheriff of Pleasants County, West Virginia, on
May 1, 1997, and charged with making harassing phone calls in violation of a family
protective order. Grievant subsequently pled guilty to those charges in the Circuit Court
of Pleasants County, and was sentenced to 12 months in jail, with 8 months suspended,
and 2 years of unsupervised probation. After he was sentenced to jail, Grievant obtained
court approval to participate in a work release program, but WVDOT did not elect to
cooperate in that program
3. WVDOT dismissed Grievant from employment in July 1997. R Ex 1; Larzo
testimony. Pursuant to a written settlement agreement, Grievant was reinstated as a
WVDOT employee in March 1998. R Ex 2. 4. On March 1, 1999, Grievant was arrested for making harassing phone calls
to his wife in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-8-16. R Ex 3.
5. On March 24, 1999, Grievant pled guilty to the charges, and was sentenced
to 7 days in jail. R Ex 3. Subsequently, on March 29, 1999, his probation was revoked
and Grievant was sentenced to serve the remainder of his 12 month sentence, with credit
for 144 days previously served. R Ex 3. Grievant's projected release date was October
7, 1999. Sheriff Barnhart testimony.
6. Grievant requested a personal leave of absence from WVDOT in accordance
with Section 15.8(a) of the Administrative Rule of the West Virginia Division of Personnel,
143 C.S.R. 1 § 15.8(a) (1998). This request was denied.
7. After he was incarcerated in March 1999, Grievant requested court approval
to participate in a work release program, but that request was denied.
8. On June 28, 1999, WVDOT notified Grievant that he was being terminated,
effective July 12, 1999, because he was not available to report for work. R Ex 3.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 29-6A-6, the burden of proof in disciplinary
matters rests with the employer, and the employer must meet that burden by proving the
charges against an employee by a preponderance of the evidence. Wellman v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Docket No. 93-HHR-079 (Oct. 18, 1993); Ramey v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health, Docket No. H-88-005 (Dec. 6, 1988).
2. A civil service employee may only be dismissed for good cause, which means
misconduct of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interest of the public,rather than upon trivial or inconsequential matters, or mere technical violations of statute
or official duty without wrongful intention. Oakes v. W. Va. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 164
W. Va. 384, 264 S.E.2d 151 (1980).
3. An essential element of employment is to be on the job when your services
are required. See Davis v. Veteran's Admin., 792 F.2d 1111, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1986). A
state employee may be dismissed for an extended absence when they are incarcerated
for engaging in criminal conduct, whether or not such conduct is related to their
employment.
4. WVDOT established by a preponderance of the evidence that Grievant was
absent from his employment without authority based upon a jail sentence imposed for
Grievant's probation violation. In the circumstances presented, Grievant's termination was
not an abuse of discretion or an arbitrary and capricious act. See Cook v. W. Va. Dep't
of Health & Human Resources, Docket No. 99-HHR-298 (Nov. 30, 1999).
Accordingly, this grievance is DENIED.
Any party, or the West Virginia Division of Personnel, may appeal this decision to
the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, or to the "circuit court of the county in which the
grievance occurred." Any such appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of receipt of this
decision. W. Va. Code § 29-6A-7 (1998). Neither the West Virginia Education and State
Employees Grievance Board nor any of its Administrative Law Judges is a party to such
appeal and should not be so named. However, the appealing party is required by W. Va.
Code § 29A-5-4(b) to serve a copy of the appeal petition upon the Grievance Board. The
appealing party must also provide the Board with the civil action number so that the record
can be prepared and properly transmitted to the appropriate circuit court.
LEWIS G. BREWER
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
Dated: January 31, 2000
Footnote: 1