WILLIAM M. WALTERS, .
Grievant, .
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v. . Docket Number: 94-BEP-086
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WEST VIRGINIA BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT .
PROGRAMS / WORKERS' COMPENSATION .
DIVISION, .
Respondents. .
DECISION
William Walters (hereinafter Grievant) was employed by the
West Virginia Bureau of Employment Programs (hereinafter
Respondent) within its Workers' Compensation Division, Records
Management Section, Microfiche Unit, until his suspension on March
10, 1994, and subsequent dismissal which became effective April 12,
1994. Grievant filed the instant complaint pursuant to the state
employee grievance procedure provisions of West Virginia Code §29-6A-1 et seq., on March 15, 1994. Thereafter, two days of hearing
were held on August 8 and 10, 1994, and the case became mature for
decision on September 2, 1994, after receipt of the parties' post-hearing briefs.
Background
The Microfiche Unit (hereinafter Unit) consists of twelve
employees, most of whom are classified as Office Assistants.
Delores Kuhl is currently the manager of the Records Management
Section. Alma Downey is the immediate supervisor over the
employees in the Unit and, Penny Parish, who was a supervisor in
the Unit, is now the supervisor over the Create Update Master
Section. The Unit is responsible for converting paper documents
into microfiche film and storing this end product for later
reference. Generally, the employees take hundreds of pictures of
documents with microfiche cameras per day. The nature of the
various tasks within the Unit is routine, repetitive and non-complex. Because of this, the employees often find it difficult to
focus on their assigned tasks, and instead, interact with each
other on a personal basis. The record is replete with references
to personality conflicts within the Unit.
On February 15, 1994, two employees in the Unit, Terry Graley
and Freda Smith, engaged in a physical altercation. The fight
resulted from personality conflicts between the two employees as
Ms. Smith is described as a religious fundamentalist and Mr. Graley
is alleged to be a homosexual. Both employees had been arguing
with each other for months. For their respective roles in the
fight, both employees were fired after an internal investigation
into the event was completed. According to all accounts, Grievant
openly acted friendly towards both Ms. Smith and Mr. Graley prior
to the fight.
As noted, Commissioner Andrew Richardson requested that an
investigation be conducted to ascertain the facts surrounding the
fight between Ms. Smith and Mr. Graley. Mr. Richardson assigned
two employees, Donald Pardue, Management Analysis Division Director
and Sandy Ball, Employment Programs, Specialist, Senior, to the
task of performing the fact-finding investigation. Mr. Pardue and
Ms. Ball conducted interviews of ten employees, including Grievant,
and from notes that they had taken during the interviews, prepared
written statements that each interviewee later reviewed and signed
signifying that it was an accurate reflection of the oral statement
given. The employees were given an oath before being questioned
and each employee was also asked to sign a form titled Statement of
Truthful Testimony and Confidentiality. The form of this statement
is as follows:
I , understand that my statement/s
given to Donald Pardue and Sandy Ball in the conduct
of their investigation is voluntary.
I also understand that said statement/s will be
truthful to the best of my knowledge and that the content
of said testimony will be confidential.
I further understand that giving false testimony
and/or my failure to keep said testimony confidential,
may lead to civil actions and/or disciplinary action to
include, but not limited to, suspension and/or dismissal
from employment.
Any other pertinent memoranda or documents related to the incident
were included in the investigative file. Commissioner Richardson
made the decision to fire both Ms. Smith and Mr. Graley after
reviewing the complete investigative file on February 28, 1994.
Also, Ms. Downey, Ms. Parish and another employee, Alan Roberts,
were issued reprimands as a result of the investigation. The two
supervisors were reprimanded for not having dealt effectively with
the known and existing personality conflicts within the Unit prior
to the fight. It was believed that had the supervisors acted
appropriately, the fight could have been avoided.
Respondent believed that one or more of the employees violated
the confidentiality of the investigation by making statements to
other employees concerning the questions asked by, and the answers
given to, the investigators. A second investigation was authorized
to determine if one or more employees had breached their promise to
keep the nature of the investigation private. The same
investigators interviewed and took statements from Ms. Downey, Mike
Pritt, Ms. Parish and Grievant between December 8 and 10. Donald
Pardue made the following conclusion in the investigative report:
"It has been determined that employees did violate the
confidentiality provisions, impeded investigations and caused undue
stress on other employees by their actions . . .."
On March 10, 1994, prior to having reviewed the second
investigative findings, Mr. Richardson suspended Grievant for
thirty days for having failed to keep the substance of the first
investigation confidential; for having made statements to his co-workers which were untrue and which led those employees to become
defensive during their interviews; and for having contributed to
the creation of a hostile working environment (related to the
Graley-Smith altercation). The alleged untrue statements
attributed to Grievant were discussed in the suspension letter.
Grievant met with Executive Secretary John Burdette on March 9,
1994, and with Mr. Richardson on March 17, 1994, regarding his
suspension.
Upon reviewing the findings from the second investigation,
Commissioner Richardson concluded that Grievant had breached the
confidentiality of the first investigation on three different
occasions. By letter dated March 28, 1994, Commissioner Richardson
notified Grievant of his decision to dismiss him for
insubordination; violation of confidentiality of an internal
investigation; impeding an investigation; and causing dissention in
the work place. It was agreed to by the parties that a meeting
concerning Grievant's dismissal would be held on April 13, 1994,
one day after the effective date of his dismissal. Thereafter,
Grievant's dismissal was affirmed by letter to his counsel.
Parties' Arguments
Grievant denies that he breached the confidentiality of the
first investigation. He maintains that he only made one false
statement concerning the Smith-Graley altercation, that this
statement was made prior to the first investigation, and was
neither made to the investigators nor the supervisors of the Unit.
Therefore, Grievant argues that Respondent has not met its burdenof proof with regard to either his suspension or dismissal.
Grievant also avers that, assuming arguendo, Respondent has proven
that he made statements which violated the confidentiality of the
first investigation, such misconduct cannot support a finding of
just cause for his dismissal. Further, Grievant argues that his
termination from employment was not based upon any wrongdoing
separate and apart from that relied upon to support his suspension.
Finally, he asserts that Respondent did not follow its own
progressive disciplinary policy in terminating him.
Respondent maintains that Grievant violated the
confidentiality of both the first and second investigations; and
therefore, it had just cause to suspend and later dismiss him. It
contends that Grievant made false statements to his co-workers and
supervisors in order for them to tell him information related to
the contemplated discipline of Mr. Graley and Ms. Smith.
Respondent asserts that it has proven the facts supporting
Grievant's suspension and dismissal by a preponderance of the
evidence. Finally, it denies that it failed to comply with its
progressive disciplinary policy.
Discussion of Charges
A. Creation of Hostile Work Environment
As was noted, Grievant was both suspended and dismissed for
having "contributed to the creation of a hostile working
environment" and for "causing dissention in the work place." With
regard to these charges, Respondent argued that Grievant's conduct
instigated the physical altercation of February 15. It attemptedto establish this through the testimony of Grievant's co-workers
and supervisors. Mostly, these individuals provided opinions and
speculation as to why they believed Grievant acted as a friend to
both Ms. Smith and Mr. Graley in order to "pit" them against each
other. The witnesses testified that, at times, Grievant could be
seen whispering to one of these employees and then, at different
times, to the other. From this it was assumed that Grievant was
helping to "fuel the fire" of conflict. At least one of Grievant's
co-workers (a witness of Respondent) testified that Grievant
actually helped Ms. Smith and Mr. Graley get along better.
The Undersigned has carefully reviewed the testimony of
Respondent's witnesses and also the statements presented to the
investigators. Unfortunately, it is obvious from even a cursory
review of the evidence and of the tone of the witnesses that most
of the employees within the Unit continually contributed to the
ongoing conflict between Ms. Smith and Mr. Graley. The workers'
lack of tolerance for personalities different from their own led to
acts of ridicule, verbal abuse, choosing sides, "tattle-telling"
and conspiratorial activity. The evidence suggests that both Ms.
Smith and Mr. Graley had engaged in inappropriate verbal exchanges
as far back as early 1993. All three of the supervisors, Ms.
Downey, Ms. Parish and Ms. Kuhl presented evidence from which it
can be inferred that Ms. Smith and Mr. Graley have been
unmanageable for an extended period of time. Further, it seemed
that it was inevitable that a physical altercation would occur at
some point.
The evidence simply cannot support a finding that it is more
likely than not that Grievant "created a hostile working
environment" through the actions relied upon by Respondent, any
more than did various other co-workers of Ms. Smith and Mr. Graley.
While it is probably true that Grievant may have done more harm
than good through the manner in which he interacted with his co-workers, his conduct is found to have been no worse than that of
many of his peers. The truth is that the individuals who had not
only the ability but the responsibility to effectively deal with
the personality conflicts within the Unit, the three supervisors,
through inaction, did more to "fuel the fire" than Grievant could
possibly have done. Further, at least one other employee's conduct
was far worse than Grievant's in creating the environment which led
to the fight and there is no evidence that this employee has ever
been disciplined. Unfortunately for Grievant, these two charges
are not the only charges upon which his discipline was based.
B. Interference with Investigations
Respondent offered testimony to establish that Grievant made
a false statement to Ms. Downey concerning the focus of the first
investigation shortly after he was interviewed by the investigators
on February 17, 1994. Ms. Downey testified that on this date,
Grievant returned to the office after being interviewed and told
her that the only thing the investigators were concerned with was
how bad she had harassed Ms. Smith and that this harassment had
made Ms. Smith "snap." Ms. Downey's statement to the investigators
on March 8, 1994, also made reference to this statement attributedto Grievant. Ms. Downey testified that Grievant's conduct caused
her to be hostile during her own interview with the investigators
and that the interview was unduly long because she believed that
they were investigating her conduct. This testimony was
corroborated by the two investigators.
Grievant testified that he did not make such a statement to
Ms. Downey. He stated that upon his return to the Unit, Ms. Downey
questioned him as to whether the investigators had asked questions
which would lead one to believe that they were investigating the
supervisors. He stated that Ms. Downey told him that she had done
nothing wrong and that neither he nor anyone else would cost her
her job. Grievant testified that the only statement he did make to
Ms. Downey was that he had simply told the investigators the truth
and that if it resulted in someone getting hurt that he was sorry.
Respondent also offered the testimony of Ms. Downey and Ms.
Parish to support its conclusion that Grievant had violated the
confidentiality of the first investigation a second time on March
8, 1994. Ms. Parish testified that on that day, Grievant made a
statement to her indicating that the investigators had told him
that she had had another employee type a memo for her recommending
that Ms. Smith be fired. Ms. Parish testified that she told
Grievant that she was not going to discuss personnel matters with
him. Ms. Parish testified that she believed this statement was
false because she did not believe that the investigators would tell
Grievant such information. Ms. Downey testified that she was
speaking with Ms. Parish when Grievant made this statement. Shestated that Grievant also asked her if she had had a similar memo
typed and she replied that she had not. Again, the investigation
statements and the testimony of the investigators corroborate Ms.
Parish's and Ms. Downey's testimony.
With regard to the nature of this allegation, Grievant gave
the following testimony:
Q: Did you have a second conversation with Ms. Downey
on March 8, 1994?
Q: Could you relate the substance of that conversation?
A: Again, I had come back from a meeting with the
investigators. It was near the end of the lunch period.
I came back to the office. Alma was sitting at her desk.
I told Alma I was back from my meeting. Alma stated,
"Bill, I know they're after Penny and I and I know
because Freda Smith and Terry Graley had been terminated.
Who else could they be after?"
As Alma was making that statement, Penny Parish
overheard it and was approaching us. She, meaning Penny,
stated to Alma, "I'll bet they're after Betsy Lambert
because Bill told the investigators about Betsy Lambert's
typing of your, meaning Alma's, statement even though we,
meaning Penny and Alma, both told Bill no such statement
existed."
I then stated to Penny Parish, "Since you brought up
the subject about Betsy Lambert's typing, who does your
typing." Penny Parish turned defensive suddenly and
said, "So, now they're asking who does my typing. So now
they're after me." She then stated, "I'm not going to
tell you, meaning me, anything. That's confidential.
Let them find out who does my typing." She then told me
to leave her office. I did.
On cross-examination, Grievant was asked about this statement and
he replied that Betsy Lambert had earlier told him that she had
typed a letter for Ms. Downey recommending that Ms. Smith be fired
and that he had related this information to the investigators on
February 28, 1994. Donald Pardue testified that Grievant madereference to this statement in his interview on March 8, 1994, and
he also referred to the written statement attributed to Grievant
contained in the second investigation. With this statement,
Grievant signed the form titled "Statement of Truthful Testimony
and Confidentiality", but he did not sign the statement affirming
that the written document was an accurate reflection of his
testimony because he was suspended prior to it having been
completed.
Respondent contends that Grievant made a third false statement
which impeded the first investigation. Mr. Pritt had earlier been
involved in a dispute about whether he had harassed a co-worker.
At hearing in the instant matter, he testified that Grievant told
him the investigators (during the first investigation) were going
to bring up the issue of whether or not he had acted properly in
the past. As a result of this statement, Mr. Pritt testified that
he was afraid to give information freely to the investigators
because he was afraid of being fired. Mr. Pardue and Ms. Ball
verified that Mr. Pritt first refused to give a voluntary statement
during his first interview. Mr. Pritt's statement taken during the
second investigation contained reference to his conversation with
Grievant but there is no mention of this statement in the written
statement of Mr. Pritt's testimony from the first interview.
Grievant denies that he made such a statement to Mr. Pritt.
Much of this case hinges upon a determination of the
credibility of the many witnesses presented by Respondent and of
Grievant. Grievant denies having made any of the false statementsattributed to him. He does admit that he made several false
statements to a co-worker prior to the initiation of the first
investigation. He denies that he made statements which would have
caused Mr. Pritt, Ms. Downey or Ms. Parish to be defensive with the
investigators. Grievant's testimony is in direct conflict with at
least five of Respondent's witnesses.
In determining whether a particular witness's testimony is
credible, a number of factors, many of which are subjective, must
be assessed. These factors include the following:
The witness's demeanor while testifying.
The extent of the witness's capacity to perceive,
recollect or communicate.
The extent of the witness's opportunity to perceive.
The witness's reputation for honesty.
The existence or non-existence of a bias, interest or
other motive.
A statement previously made by the witness that is
consistent or inconsistent with his or her
statements at the hearing.
The existence or non-existence of any fact testified to
by the witness.
The witness's attitude toward the action in which he/she
testifies or toward the giving of testimony.
The witness's admission of untruthfulness.
The plausibility of the occurrence of the matters
testified to by the witness.
Representing the Agency Before the United States Merit Systems
Protection Board, United States Office of Personnel Management, May
1984, p. 152. Grievant admitted that he had lied when he made a
statement to Mr. Graley prior to his (Mr. Graley) offering a
statement to the investigators. Respondent makes much of this
admission on behalf of Grievant. However, one must be careful in
assessing another's credibility, even though an individual has not
told the truth in one setting does not mean that the sameindividual is not credible during another. See, Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1008 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). At the time Grievant made this
statement to Mr. Graley, he was neither involved in litigation
concerning his employment nor was he giving testimony, under oath,
before a fact finder in a formal proceeding. It cannot be assumed
once it is determined that an individual has lied, that anything
else that individual testifies to is also a lie. With regard to
the alleged breaches of confidentiality, the following credibility
assessments are made.
The witnesses for Respondent, as pointed out in its post-hearing brief, all testified consistently. However, the majority
of the testimony given, especially with regard to the allegation
that Grievant was responsible for having created a detrimental
working environment, seemed very calculated. Many of the witnesses
used the same words or phrases to describe opinions that they had
or impressions that they had given. While it is somewhat
understandable, the investigators were generally not able to
provide independent testimony without resorting to the statements
in the investigative reports. Grievant's testimony was clear and
specific, to the point that it also seemed rehearsed. None of the
witnesses seemed unsure of their testimony or anxious about
testifying.
There is no evidence of record to support a finding that any
of the material witnesses had a reputation for being dishonest.
Also, the testimony of Respondent's witnesses appeared to be
consistent with the statements they had given to the investigatorsalthough their testimony was in much less detail. One
inconsistency relates to the supervisors' recommendation discussed
above. During the second investigation, Ms. Parish made the
following statement:
On Tuesday afternoon, March 8, 1994, Bill Walters came in
my office and said that they (I assumed he was referring
to the investigators . . .) said that Betsy Lambert had
typed a memo saying that Alma and I had recommended that
Freda Smith be fired. Alma was standing there and I told
Bill that I was not going to discuss personnel matters.
I had to tell him three times and he finally left my
office.
Ms. Downey stated to the investigators when asked the same
question,
Today, after Lunch, at approximately 1:30 - 2:30 p.m.,
Bill approached me and said that he wanted to talk to me.
Penny Parish walked up and he said, "Oh, no here's Penny,
I'll talk to her." I was still there in Penny's office
and Bill said, "They wanted to know if you made your
recommendations concerning the incident in writing and if
you had one of your employees type it for you." Penny
told him we do not discuss personnel matters.
At hearing, Ms. Downey stated that she never had a memorandum
prepared regarding the events on February 15; however, the
investigative file contains a memorandum written by or for Ms.
Downey detailing the fight on that date. Further, Ms. Lambert told
the investigators during the second investigation that she prepared
such a memo. It is true that the memorandum does not contain a
recommendation that Ms. Smith be fired. Further, Ms. Parish's
statement indicates that Grievant's statement implies that the
investigators knew such a memorandum had been prepared. Ms.
Downey's testimony was that Grievant was asked by the investigators
if a memorandum had been prepared.
Grievant's testimony appears consistent with the notes taken
from the pre-suspension and pre-termination hearings he was
afforded. At hearing, Grievant stated that the only false
statements he made were to Mr. Graley. This is consistent with all
of the accounts of the statements he made prior to April 12, 1994.
It is clear from the record that both Ms. Downey and Ms.
Parish believed that Grievant was a troublemaker. With regard to
Mr. Pritt, he stated that he believed Grievant was "nosey" but he,
otherwise, did not provide any testimony from which it could be
determined that he disliked Grievant. Obviously, under the
circumstances, both Ms. Parish and Ms. Downey had to have been
concerned about the nature of the questions asked of them during
the first investigation relating to their performance as
supervisors. It is also understandable that they would have been
a little reluctant during the interviews to discuss any perceived
inability on their behalf to deal with the personnel problems which
led to the fight, even if Grievant had not made any statement to
them prior to their interviews. It seems unlikely though that both
individuals would be so intimidated about the nature of the first
investigation that they would individually, or by conspiracy, try
to shift the focus of the investigation from themselves to Grievant
by creating two false stories. Finally, Respondent's witnesses'
version of the events at issue seem plausible given the overriding
theme that Grievant was, at least, interested in being involved in
the human drama within the work place.
Regarding Grievant's testimony, while the record cannot
support a finding that Grievant had a motive to make his co-workers
appear to be dishonest, he obviously had an interest in denying the
statements that were attributed to him based simply on the nature
of the evidence the Respondent presented in this case. Further,
given Grievant's theory of the case, Ms. Downey and Ms. Parish
would have had to have conspired against him in order for it to be
determined that they were lying about the alleged statement made by
him in Ms. Parish's office; such a finding, while possible, does
not seem probable given the truly inconsequential nature of the
statement attributed to him.
Grievant stated that the written statement associated with his
testimony in the second investigative report was almost 100%
inaccurate. Therefore, not only would Ms. Parish, Ms. Downey and
Mr. Pritt had to have lied about statements that he made, but also
the two investigators who questioned him a second time would have
to have lied, which seems highly unlikely. If the investigators
had wanted to prepare a false statement and attribute it to
Grievant, they could have prepared a much more damaging statement.
Finally, the responses in this second written statement appear to
be consistent with the topic of the questions the investigators
said they asked the interviewees during the investigation. Based
upon the foregoing, it is determined that Grievant's testimony
denying that he made the statements attributed to him by Respondent
is not credible.
C. Just Cause for Suspension
An agency's decision to impose discipline on an employee rests
upon the agency's consideration of facts. How the agency
classifies the facts relied upon is not as important as its ability
to prove the facts supporting the adverse action by a preponderance
of the evidence. W. Va. Code §29-6A-6; Schmidt v. W.Va. Dept. of
Highways, Docket No. DOH-88-063 (March 31, 1989). It is hereby
determined that Respondent has established that Grievant did make
the three false statements at issue. The issue is now whether
Grievant's conduct amounted to a breach of the confidentiality of
the investigation and also impeded the investigation.
Respondent stated in the two disciplinary records that
Grievant's improper conduct related to telling co-workers false
statements which made them apprehensive to give willing statements
to the investigators. The appropriateness of a penalty, while
depending upon the resolution of questions of fact, is by no means
a mere factual determination. Douglass v. Veterans Administration,
5 M.S.P.B. 280 (1981) Such a decision "involves not only an
ascertainment of the factual circumstances surrounding the
violations but also the application of administrative judgment and
discretion." Id., citing Kulkin v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 181, 185
(1st. Cir. 1980); Beall Const. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041, 1046
(8th Cir. 1974). Because the imposition of a penalty results from
an employer's administrative exercise of discretion, said action
may be the result of arbitrary and capricious decision-making or an
abuse of discretion. See, Thompson v. U.S. Postal Service, 596F.Supp. 628 (D.C.Va. 1984). Respondent has characterized
Grievant's misconduct as insubordination.
Insubordination is usually defined by this Grievance Board as
"a deliberate, willful or intentional refusal or failure to comply
with a reasonable order of a supervisor." Reynolds v. Kanawha-Charleston Health Department, Docket No. 90-H-128 (Aug. 8, 1990),
citing Gill v. West Virginia Dep't of Commerce, Docket No. COMM-88-031 (Dec. 23, 1988). "Generally, an employee must obey a
supervisor's order and take appropriate action to challenge the
validity of the supervisor's order. Employees are expected to
respect authority and do not have the unfettered discretion to
disobey or ignore clear instructions." Reynolds, citing Meads v.
Veteran Admin., 36 M.S.P.R. 574 (1988); Daniel v. United States
Postal Serv., 16 M.S.P.R. 486 (1983); and Davis v. Smithsonian
Inst., 13 M.S.P.R. 77 (1983). Further, it has also been stated
that insubordination "encompasses more than an explicit order and
subsequent refusal to carry it out. It may also involve a flagrant
or willful disregard for implied directions of an employer."
Sexton v. Marshall University, Docket No. BOR2-88-029-4 (May 25,
1988),
(See footnote 1) citing Weber v. Buncombe County Board of Education, 266
S.E.2d 42 (N.C. 1980). A thorough discussion of what constitutes
insubordination was made in In re Burton Manufacturing Company, 82
L.A. 1228 (March 2, 1984). In Burton, the Arbitrator recognized that
In general, if an employee refuses to obey an order or
defies the authority of Management, he is guilty of
insubordination. This is a serious offense and may
justify disciplinary measures, including discharge. An
employee may be charged with insubordination not only if
he willfully disobeys an order, but also if he . . . uses
abusive, threatening, or profane language in speaking to
Management; or assaults a representative of Management.
In most cases that come before Arbitrators, the employee
either denies the alleged subordinate act or gives
reasons why it was justified.
Burton, p. 1234, citing Trotta, Arbitration of Labor-Management
Disputes, New York: AMACOM, 1974, pp. 282-283. The Arbitrator in
Burton went further to state a generally recognized principle of
employment relations law that
Furthermore the company has the right to demand that
subordinate personnel not manifest disrespect toward
supervisory personnel which undermine their status,
prestige, and authority, thus mitigating against plant
efficiency.
Burton, p. 1234.
Respondent contends that Grievant was insubordinate because he
made false statements to co-workers concerning the substance of the
first investigation after having agreed not to breach the
confidentiality of the investigation upon express request by the
investigators. The question would not be a close one if it had
been established that Grievant made statements to his co-workers
which contained questions and comments derived from his interview
with the investigators. However, the key issue herein is whether
Grievant breached any confidentiality by making statements to his
co-workers which were not actually discussed during his interview,
and whether this can be classified as insubordination.
Grievant did not breach the confidentiality of the first
investigation because he did not relate to his co-workers any of
the statements that he had given to the investigators or any of the
questions that he had been asked. The substance of the first
investigation was not compromised. Further, Grievant did not
impede the first investigation because the investigation was
successfully completed according to the testimony of the
investigators and Respondent's agents. As Grievant's counsel
correctly points out, the statements obtained through the
interviewing process were declared to be truthful and accurate
statements as attested to by the interviewees. Further, there was
no evidence that the investigation took longer than expected to
complete. The only evidence of any real harm was that Ms. Downey
was defensive for the first portion of her interview. Mr. Pritt
initially declined to voluntarily give an interview but agreed to
do so upon insistence by the investigators.
What Grievant is guilty of is having attempted to impede the
investigation by make false statements to his co-workers in order
to trick them into providing him information so that he would be
familiar with the decision-making analysis. Grievant felt that by
doing so, maybe he could influence the outcome of the investigation
because he was not confident in the abilities of the agents of
Respondent to understand all of the relevant and material facts or
to assess them properly. Grievant was not insubordinate as that
term is normally defined; however, he was, nonetheless,
insubordinate in interfering with the official actions of hisemployer and by showing disrespect for his superiors. Grievant,
through his actions, attempted to undermine the authority of his
superiors and to influence their exercise of discretionary
decision-making authority. He was asked specifically not to act in
such a manner which would interfere with the investigation and it
is expected that all employees should show respect to the authority
of their employer to handle an administrative matter.
Upon a thorough reading of the suspension letter, in
conjunction with the testimony of Thomas Rardin, Personnel
Administrator, and John Burdette, Executive Secretary, it is
concluded that the thrust of Grievant's suspension for thirty days
was for his insubordinate behavior. Therefore, based upon the
discussion above, it is determined that Respondent has met its
burden of proof with regard to the charges upon which Grievant's
suspension was based even though it was not established that he
created a hostile working environment. His dismissal shall now be
discussed.
D. Just Cause for Dismissal
Grievant argues that he was suspended and then dismissed for
the same charges, therefore, Respondent did not follow its own
progressive discipline policy. This is factually incorrect.
Grievant was suspended on March 10, 1994 and his false statement to
Ms. Downey and Ms. Parish was made on March 8, 1994, immediately
after he returned from his interview in the second investigation;
however, Commissioner Richardson did not have knowledge of the
March 8 statement until after the suspension. Even though theevents had transpired prior to March 10, 1994, Grievant's
termination was based upon additional facts made known to
Commissioner Richardson. Grievant's challenge to his dismissal on
this basis is not persuasive.
As our Supreme Court recognized long ago,
In order to support a dismissal of a covered employee,
the evidence must show good cause thereof. Such cause
must be substantial. 'The cause must be one which
specifically relates to and effects the administration of
the office, and must be restricted to something of a
substantial nature directly effecting the rights and
interests of the public. An officer should not be
removed from office on trivial or inconsequential
matters, or for mere technical violations of statute or
official duty without wrongful intention.'
Guine v. Civil Service Commission, 149 W.Va. 461, 468, 141 S.E.2d
364, 369 (1965), citing, 67 C.J.S., Officers, Section 60b.
Respondent contends that Grievant's actions were egregious and
grossly improper because he tried to impede the official actions of
his employer and disrupt the work place by lying to his co-workers
and supervisors. It avers that he purposefully ignored directions
given to him by his superiors and compromised the integrity of the
Bureau. It argues that Grievant's conduct substantially affected
the interests of the public by interfering with its efficient and
effective operations. Grievant maintains that no harm occurred as
a result of his actions and that Respondent cannot prove that he
intentionally set out to impede any agency action. He argues that
he intended only to help his co-workers and supervisors.
First of all, Grievant's actions were intentional. And while
the final result of those actions was that only minimal harm
occurred, his conduct exhibited a lack of honesty and integrity tothe extent that the employer now has no confidence in his ability
to perform as an effective employee. Grievant's actions did create
controversy and anxiety among his co-workers, if only for the
express purpose of him being involved in or informed of agency
decisions which he had no right to influence. Grievant
demonstrated a lack of respect for the authority of Respondent's
agents and a contempt for the investigative process which it used
to impose discipline on other employees.
However, even after recognizing that Grievant's actions were
improper, it is not concluded that Grievant's misconduct directly,
negatively affected the rights or interests of the public to the
extent that just cause for his dismissal exists. Grievant's
insubordination did not result in Respondent being unable to
adequately support its decision to fire Ms. Smith or Mr. Graley nor
did it prevent Respondent from gathering sufficient information
upon which to reprimand other employees. Further, these
investigations never "stalled" as a result of Grievant's actions.
While Grievant's behavior cannot and is not condoned, it was not
egregious enough to warrant his dismissal.
Respondent's Administrative Directive, section 6400.20
entitled Employee Responsibilities, establishes its recommendations
for progressive discipline. This policy states, in pertinent part,
It should be recognized, however, that disciplinary
actions, will be tailored to suit the circumstances of
the misconduct, its seriousness, and the employee's past
record. The same disciplinary action may in some cases,
therefore, not be taken for similar infractions. . .
. Except in cases of flagrant violations of acceptable
behavior, an attempt will be made to apply discipline in
progressive steps in order that an opportunity forcorrective action is available to the employee.
Employees will be disciplined generally as follows:
A) Oral reprimand - . . .
B) written reprimand - . . .
C) Suspension - . . . A suspension may also be
considered as the first step if the employee is guilty of
serious offenses, such as, failure to report to work
without notification for 3 or more days, use of foul
language or abusive language, failure to comply with
regulations, falsification of records, or illegal
political activity.
D) Demotion or Dismissal - . . .
Flagrant misconduct which may result in demotion or
dismissal without previous disciplinary action includes:
gross misconduct, theft, conviction of a felony related
to the job, use of political influence to gain employment
advantage, intoxication or use of unauthorized drugs on
the job, insubordination, or willful destruction of
property.
Grievant's conduct is more comparable to the type of misconduct
associated with suspension than with demotion or dismissal. His
conduct was not nearly as serious as theft, conviction of a job-related felony or willful destruction of governmental property. It
is recognized that insubordination may be grounds for dismissal;
however, insubordination is a term which can be used to define
numerous types of misconduct of varying severity. Therefore,
Grievant's dismissal may not be upheld simply on the basis that
this section contains reference to insubordination.
During the period of over two years Grievant worked with
Respondent, he was not disciplined in any manner. He was also
given performance evaluations within the "good" rating. Although
Respondent attempted to demonstrate that Grievant had previously
engaged in similar conduct with regard to an earlier investigation
in January 1994, he was never disciplined for the alleged
misconduct. The fact is that no confidentiality agreement was usedduring this earlier investigation. Therefore, the alleged conduct
is not of the same nature. Further, no reference was made in
either the suspension or dismissal letter to any misconduct
attributed to Grievant prior to February 22, 1994. Based upon the
foregoing, it is hereby concluded that Grievant's suspension for
thirty days was a sufficient penalty to be imposed based upon the
misconduct established. Grievant's termination is hereby
overturned as it is determined that Respondent abused its authority
in exercising its administrative discretion by deciding under the
facts as proven that Grievant should have been terminated.
The following findings of fact have been properly deduced from
the evidentiary record developed in the case.
Findings of Fact
1. Grievant was employed by Respondent for over two years
within its Workers' Compensation Division, Records Management
Section, Microfiche Unit, until his suspension on March 10, 1994
and subsequent dismissal effective April 12, 1994.
2. On February 15, 1994, a fight occurred between two of
Grievant's co-workers. As a result, Respondent initiated a formal
investigation into the facts behind the incident. This
investigation consisted of employee interviews where the substance
of the discussions was to be kept confidential.
3. Grievant was interviewed during this first investigation.
After his interview, Grievant made false statements to three of his
peers as to the nature of the questions asked of him during his
interview. After Respondent discovered the first two of Grievant'sthree lies, he was suspended for thirty days. Respondent then
initiated a second investigation into whether the substance of the
first investigation was kept confidential.
4. Respondent learned that Grievant had lied a third time as
a result of reviewing the findings of the second investigation.
Thereafter, Grievant was dismissed.
5. The first investigation was not compromised in any way by
Grievant's misconduct.
6. Grievant contributed to, but certainly was not solely
responsible for, the working environment which spawned the fight on
February 15, 1994. Grievant's conduct in relation thereto was no
more improper than other employees but was less responsible than
others who had supervisory responsibility.
7. Grievant did not breach the confidentiality of either of
the investigations as he did not make statements to his peers
concerning questions he was asked or answers he had given at either
of the two interviews at issue.
The foregoing discussion of the case is hereby supplemented by
the following appropriately made conclusions of law.
Conclusions of Law
1. Grievant's actions on February 22, and March 8, 1994,
amounted to insubordination in that he attempted to undermine the
authority of his superiors and to influence their exercise of
discretionary decision-making authority. See, Sexton v. Marshall
University, Docket No. BOR2-88-029-4 (May 25, 1988); In re Burton
Manufacturing Company, 82 L.A. 1228 (March 2, 1984).
2. In order to support the dismissal of a tenured public
employee, the employer must establish that the employee engaged in
misconduct of a substantial nature directly effecting the rights
and interests of the public. Guine v. Civil Service Commission,
149 W.Va. 461, 141 S.E.2d 364 (1965).
3. Respondent has not established just cause for Grievant's
termination.
4. The thirty-day suspension imposed upon Grievant for his
acts of insubordination is consistent with Respondent's progressive
disciplinary policy and, therefore, it is upheld.
Accordingly, this grievance is hereby GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. It is hereby ORDERED that Grievant's termination
from employment be nullified and all reference to said adverse
action shall be removed from his personnel file. Grievant is to be
reinstated to his former position with all benefits, back pay and
interest, consistent with the discussion in this Decision, except
that Grievant's suspension on March 10, 1994, for the period of
thirty days therefrom, is hereby affirmed.
Any party or the West Virginia Division of Personnel may
appeal this decision to the "circuit court of the county in which
the grievance occurred," and such appeal must be filed within
thirty (30) days of receipt of this decision. W. Va. Code §29-6A-7. Neither the West Virginia Education and State Employees
Grievance Board nor any of its Administrative Law Judges is a party
to such appeal and should not be so named. Any appealing party
must advise this office of the intent to appeal and provide the
civil action number so that the record can be prepared and
transmitted to the appropriate court.
________________________________
ALBERT C. DUNN, JR.
Administrative Law Judge
January 23, 1995
Footnote: 1 Sexton was affirmed in part and reversed in part by the
Kanawha County Circuit Court, Docket No. 88-AA-154. It was then
appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the circuit court's
ruling. The cite to that Supreme Court case is Sexton v. Marshall
University, 387 S.E.2d 529 (W.Va. 1989).