TOM JEWELL,
Grievant,
v. Docket No. 93-HHR-281
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN RESOURCES at
COLIN ANDERSON CENTER,
Employer.
D E C I S I O N
This complaint was filed by Tom Jewell (hereinafter Grievant)
against his employer, the West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources (hereinafter HHR), on January 26, 1993. Grievant
is a Health Service Worker assigned to the Colin Anderson Center
(hereinafter Center). The facts in this case are not in dispute,
and the issue involves only a question of law. The following
findings of fact are deduced from the record.
Findings of Fact
1. On December 18, 1992, Grievant was suspended from his
employment, without pay, for a period of three days, pending the
outcome of a formal investigation into an allegation of patientabuse made by a co-worker. The investigation was conducted by an
advocate for the West Virginia Legal Aid Society.
2. Prior to Grievant's suspension, he was assigned to work
within the Mobile Grounds Crew of the Vocational Education
Department at the Center.
3. Grievant's letter of suspension stated that because he
was suspended relating to an allegation of patient abuse, upon his
return to duty he would be assigned to the Can Redemption Program
in the Vocational Education Department at the Center.
4. Grievant filed this complaint challenging his suspension
and his grievance was granted, in part, at level three. It was
determined that the charges supporting Grievant's suspension were
not proven by a preponderance of the evidence; however, it was
determined that his transfer was not violative of any policy,
regulation or law.
5. Grievant appealed to level four challenging his transfer.
Discussion
Grievant simply contends that the reason for his transfer
dissipated once it was determined at level three that he had not
committed any act of patient abuse. He requests that his transfer
by rescinded because the charges which formed the basis for his
suspension and transfer were not proven by a preponderance of the
evidence. HHR contends that Grievant's transfer was not and is not
currently violative of any policy, rule or regulation.
The Division of Personnel's Administrative Regulations, Series
I (1991), Section 12.05(a), states, in pertinent part,
Except as otherwise provided in Section 11.05, a
transfer of an employee from a position in one sub-division of an agency to a comparable class in another
organizational sub-division of the same or another agency
may be made at any time by the appointing authorities
concerned. . . ..
It is well-settled that a classified public employee does not have
the same protected property interest in his/her job assignments as
he/she has in continued employment. See, Baker v. Civil Service
Commission, 245 S.E.2d 908 (W.Va. 1978); Johnson v. W.Va. Dept. of
HHR, Docket No. 93-HHR-239 (Oct. 7, 1993). Grievant is not
alleging that his transfer should be rescinded because he is not
performing similar duties, he is simply contending that the motives
behind the transfer are unfair.
Grievant's employer could legally have transferred Grievant to
the Can Redemption Program pursuant to Personnel's regulation prior
to him being accused of patient abuse, so long as that action was
not taken for an impermissible reason, such as retaliation,
discrimination, etc. In the realm of labor and employment
relations, this type of discretionary authority is common. In
Grievant's case, his transfer was actually reaffirmed by the
employer after it had received and reviewed the grievance decision
at level three; the employer made a decision to uphold Grievant's
transfer even though it had not been proven by a preponderance of
the evidence that he had committed the alleged abuse. This
conscious decision to leave Grievant in the Can Redemption Program
was a valid exercise of the employer's discretionary authority and
can be viewed as a separate administrative decision from the
initial one to transfer Grievant.
Ms. Gloria Cox, Vocational Director in-charge of the Center's
day programming, was the only witness called to testify at level
four. Ms. Cox explained the various reasons why Grievant's
transfer was reaffirmed. In summary, she stated that Grievant's
transfer affected other employees' assignments because certain
employees could only work certain schedules. Grievant's transfer
had a domino effect on the assignments at the Center; therefore,
simply reassigning Grievant to his previous position would be
difficult to achieve with the current staff and would cause a
certain amount a resentment among the workers. Ms. Cox concluded
by stating that some of the employees who were also transferred as
a direct result of Grievant's transfer had wanted such a transfer
prior to February 3, 1993. She opined that both programs were
operating more effectively and efficiently since the situation
occurred.
While it may appear to be unfair, Grievant has not established
any legal requirement that he be returned to his former work
station as a result of the findings and conclusions in the level
three decision. The employer's reasons for the transfer, both at
the time of the initial transfer and after the level three decision
was rendered, do not appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious. It must also be stressed, however, that it has not
been proven that Grievant committed any improper acts of abuse.
Therefore, the employee would appear to have an ethical or moral
obligation to alleviate any negative effects that the initialtransfer has had and still may suffer as a result of said transfer.
Grievant is obviously a very proud and conscientious worker.
The foregoing discussion of the facts of the case and of the
applicable law to those facts is hereby supplemented by the
following appropriate conclusion of law.
Conclusion of Law
Grievant has failed to provide the undersigned with any legal
authority to support the conclusion that his transfer of February
3, 1993, must be rescinded as a direct result of the findings and
conclusions of the level three grievance evaluator which held that
the employer had not proven that Grievant was guilty of abuse. In
this case, the employer's transfer of Grievant was not shown to be
an abuse of its discretionary decision-making authority.
Therefore, this grievance is hereby DENIED.
Any party or the West Virginia Division of Personnel may
appeal this decision to the "circuit court of the county in which
the grievance occurred," and such appeal must be filed within
thirty (30) days of receipt of this decision. W.Va. Code §29-6A-7.
Neither the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance
Board nor any of its Administrative Law Judges is a party to such
appeal and should not be so named. Any appealing party must advise
this office of the intent to appeal and provide the civil action
number so that the record can be prepared and transmitted to the
appropriate court.
________________________________
ALBERT C. DUNN, JR.
Administrative Law Judge
January 21, 1994