Michele L. Rusen
Kimberly
D. Bentley C.
Blaine Myers
Rusen & White
Assistant
General Counsel
Parkersburg, West Virginia
Charleston,
West Virginia
Attorney for Appellant
Daniel
B. Douglass, II
Law
Office of
Daniel
B. Douglass, II
Parkersburg,
West Virginia
Attorneys
for Appellee,
West
Virginia Department of
Health
and Human Resources,
Bureau
for Child Support
Enforcement
Myers
& Powell
Attorney
for Appellee,
Jennifer
Dawn Shepard
CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICES MAYNARD
AND
ALBRIGHT concur, in part, and
dissent, in part, and
reserve the
right to file concurring and dissenting opinions.
1. “In reviewing challenges
to findings made by a family law master that also were adopted by a circuit
court, a three-pronged standard of review is applied. Under these circumstances,
a final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to
a de novo review.” Syllabus point 1, Burnside v. Burnside,
194 W. Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995).
2. The Department of Health
and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement may file an action
to recover reimbursement of monies it paid for birth and medical expenses
exclusively from the biological father of a child born out of wedlock.
3. The
right of the Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support
Enforcement to request the biological father of a child born out of wedlock
to make reimbursement for birth and medical expenses, is dependent upon the
biological father's ability to pay such costs on the date the mother was granted
birth and medical benefits. The determination of the biological father's ability
to pay must be made through administrative action or a court proceeding.
Davis, Chief Justice:
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1999, the instant action was filed against Mr.
Carpenter. The action sought to establish child support for the parties' child,
as well as reimbursement of the birth and medical expenses paid by DHHR. The
case was heard by a family law master
(See footnote 1) on May 5, 1999, who submitted
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law to the circuit court.
This recommendation included a requirement that Mr. Carpenter reimburse the
full amount of the birth and medical expenses paid by DHHR on behalf of Ms.
Shepard. Mr. Carpenter objected to he being solely responsible for payment
of these expenses. The circuit court remanded the issue for the family law
master to explain the reason for requiring Mr. Carpenter to be exclusively
responsible for the birth and medical expenses. The family law master reconsidered
the issue and again recommended Mr. Carpenter reimburse DHHR the full amount
of birth and medical expenses. By order entered August 11, 2000, the circuit
court adopted the family law master's recommended findings and conclusions.
It is from these rulings that Mr. Carpenter now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
III. DISCUSSION A. Requiring Reimbursement to be Paid Only by Mr.
Carpenter
Kathy L.B. involved the payment of birth
expenses under our paternity statute. This prior decision also establishes
a basis for the trial court's determination that Mr. Carpenter is obligated
to reimburse DHHR for birthing and medical expenses as Kathy L.B. and
the instant case both involved children born out of wedlock and biological
fathers who did not provide financial support for birth and medical expenses.
However, in Kathy L.B., the mother actually made the payments. In the
instant case, DHHR made the payments. Therefore, a simple comparison of these
facts suggests that it would be inconsistent for this Court to require a biological
father to pay birth and medical expenses when the mother actually bore the
costs, but to relieve the father of such an obligation when DHHR pays such
expenses because of the mother's indigence.
Mr. Carpenter next argues that he is being unlawfully
discriminated against on the basis of his gender, because Ms. Shepard is not
obligated to assume part of the costs of the birth and medical expenses. We
will review this equal protection claim under rational basis scrutiny.
(See footnote 4)
See Syl. pt. 4, in part, Carvey v. West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ., 206 W.Va. 720, 527 S.E.2d 831 (1999) (“Where economic rights are concerned, we
look to see whether the classification is a rational one based on social,
economic, historic or geographic factors, whether it bears a reasonable relationship
to a proper governmental purpose, and whether all persons within the class
are treated equally. Where such classification is rational and bears the requisite
reasonable relationship, the statute does not violate . . . equal protection[.]”
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). Accord Syl. pt. 4,
Gibson v. West Virginia Dep't of Highways, 185 W. Va. 214, 406 S.E.2d
440 (1991); Syl. pt. 4, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale
Grocery Co., 174 W. Va. 538, 328 S.E.2d 144 (1984); Syl. pt. 7, Atchinson
v. Erwin, 172 W. Va. 8, 302 S.E.2d 78 (1983). In response to this argument, DHHR has presented
several reasons for its policy of not seeking reimbursement from unwed mothers
for birth and medical expenses. Before DHHR makes the determination to provide
payment for birth and medical expenses for a woman, the woman must prove that
she is indigent under DHHR guidelines. In other words, Ms. Shepard became
eligible for assistance from DHHR only because a determination was made that
she could not pay the birth and medical expenses for her child.
(See footnote 5)
DHHR also asserts that it does not look at the income of a woman after a child has
been born in order to determine whether the woman is in a better financial
situation that may enable her to pay the reimbursement. Rather, DHHR has taken
a policy position that pregnant indigent women may be discouraged from seeking
necessary medical benefits if they would later be obligated to repay monies
awarded. Thus, DHHR contends that its failure to seek reimbursement from Ms.
Shepard was not because she was a woman but because it had determined that
she was financially unable to pay.
(See footnote 6) See In re Comm'r
of Soc. Servs. of Franklin County, 623 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16 (1995), modified
sub nom., Commissioner of Soc. Servs. of Franklin County v. Bernard
B., 637 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1995) (“[T]he mother's receipt of . . . benefits
to cover the birth established, per se, an inability to contribute to those
expenses.”).
In view of the foregoing discussion we find that
DHHR's policy of not seeking reimbursement of birth and medical expenses from
indigent pregnant women is a rational one and bears a reasonable relationship
to a proper governmental purpose. We hold, therefore, that the Department
of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement may file
an action to recover reimbursement of monies it paid for birth and medical
expenses exclusively from the biological father of a child born out of wedlock.
Based upon our holding, the circuit court correctly found that DHHR could
seek reimbursement exclusively from Mr. Carpenter. B. Determination of Mr. Carpenter's Ability to Pay
In the instant proceeding, however, DHHR contends
that a Huffman hearing is not applicable because, unlike AFDC benefits,
there is no criteria for determining Mr. Carpenter's ability to pay birth
and medical expenses. We do not find this argument to be persuasive. DHHR
has admitted that a formula exists which was used to determine whether Ms.
Shepard was eligible to receive birth and medical expenses. Likewise, DHHR
has conceded that a formula exists for determining whether an intact married
couple qualifies for birth and medical expenses. Consequently, we do not accept
DHHR's representation that no criteria exists for determining Mr. Carpenter's
ability to pay. The formula used in either of the above scenarios could be
tailored to assess Mr. Carpenter's financial capabilities. The issue of ability to pay reimbursement for birth
expenses previously has been addressed in the case of In re Commissioner
of Social Services of Franklin County, 623 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1995).
(See footnote 8)
In that decision, a social service agency filed an action against
an unwed father to recover reimbursement for Medicaid funds paid in connection
with the birth of the child. At the time of the child's birth, the father
was himself a recipient of Medicaid benefits. The court observed that because
of the mother's indigence at the time of the child's birth, the social service
agency could not seek reimbursement from her. Consequently, equal protection
principles prohibited the agency from seeking reimbursement from the father,
who was in the same financial situation as the mother when the benefits were
obtained. The decision held that “to impose liability upon a father who
is no more financially able than the mother . . . would violate principles
of gender-neutrality.” Franklin County, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 16. See
also
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the right
of the Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support
Enforcement to request the biological father of a child born out of wedlock
to make reimbursement for birth and medical expenses is dependent upon the
biological father's ability to pay such costs on the date the mother was granted
birth and medical benefits. The determination of the biological father's ability
to pay must be made through administrative action or a court proceeding. Insofar
as Mr. Carpenter was denied a hearing to determine his ability to pay the
reimbursement sought by DHHR, this case must be reversed and remanded for
such a hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
James Carpenter, appellant/defendant below (hereinafter
referred to as “Mr. Carpenter”), appeals from an order of the Circuit
Court of Wood County. The circuit court's order required Mr. Carpenter to reimburse
the Department of Health and Human Resources, Bureau for Child Support Enforcement
(hereinafter referred to as “DHHR”), appellee/plaintiff below, $4,878.59
for birth and medical expenses paid on behalf of Jennifer Dawn Shepard (hereinafter
referred to as “Ms. Shepard”), appellee/plaintiff below. Mr. Carpenter
has raised numerous contentions in opposition to such payment. Essentially,
Mr. Carpenter is alleging that he and Ms. Shepard should each be required to
pay the reimbursement. Alternatively, Mr. Carpenter argues that a determination
should be made of his ability to pay for the birth and medical expenses of his
child. After reviewing the briefs and record in the case, the circuit court's
order is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and the case is remanded.
This case arose as a result of the birth of a child
to Ms. Shepard and Mr. Carpenter. Though not married, Ms. Shepard and Mr. Carpenter
were living together in 1997 when Ms. Shepard became pregnant. During her pregnancy,
Ms. Shepard sought and obtained medical financial assistance from DHHR. On November
9, 1997, Ms. Shepard gave birth to their child. Mr. Carpenter acknowledged paternity of the child
immediately after the child was born. However, in 1998, Mr. Carpenter moved
out of the home he shared with Ms. Shepard.
This Court employs a three-pronged standard of review
of appeals involving domestic relations matters. We set out this standard in
Syllabus point 1 of Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W. Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d
264 (1995), as follows:
In reviewing
challenges to findings made by a family law master that also were adopted by
a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of review is applied. Under these
circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations
are subject to a de novo review.
By this standard, we review the arguments of the parties.
Mr. Carpenter has postured a number of reasons as to
why it was error to require him to pay the full amount of reimbursement owed
to DHHR for birth and medical expenses. The circuit court, in part, relied upon
this Court's holding in Kathy L.B. v. Patrick J.B., 179 W. Va. 655, 371
S.E.2d 583 (1988), to hold Mr. Carpenter exclusively responsible for the reimbursement.
The decision in Kathy L.B. involved the birth
of a child born out of wedlock. The mother of the child sought, among other
things, reimbursement for birthing and medical expenses from the biological
father of the child. The lower tribunals denied such relief. On appeal, this
Court noted that nothing in the paternity statutes precluded recovery of birthing
and medical expenses from the biological father as child support payment. Consequently,
we held in Syllabus point 1, in part, of Kathy L.B. that “[i]n a
paternity action . . . the mother may recover the birth expenses . . . from
the child's natural father.” 179 W. Va. 655, 371 S.E.2d 583.
On appeal to this Court, Mr. Carpenter contends that
the requirement under Kathy L.B., that the biological father of a child
born out of wedlock has the exclusive burden of paying birth expenses, is inconsistent
with W. Va. Code § 48-12-102.
(See footnote 2) We disagree. The relevant language
in W. Va. Code § 48-12-102 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2001) provides that “[i]n
every action to establish or modify an order which requires the payment of child
support, the court shall ascertain the ability of each parent to provide medical
care for the children of the parties.” Kathy L.B. is not inconsistent
with the equitable cost sharing provided under W. Va. Code § 48-12-102
because Kathy L.B. addressed the issue of payment of past birth
expenses paid by a mother for a child born out of wedlock. On the other hand,
W. Va. Code § 48-12-102 was intended to provide for establishing, if possible,
joint payment of prospective health insurance coverage for children.
(See footnote 3)
See Syl. pt. 2, Ball v. Wills, 190 W. Va. 517, 438 S.E.2d 860 (1993) (“West Virginia Code [§ 48-12-102]
mandates that the trial court shall ascertain each parent's ability to provide
medical care for their children each time an order requiring child support
payments is either established or modified.”). Thus, W. Va. Code §
48-12-102 does not apply to an action brought by a mother or DHHR that seeks
reimbursement for past birth expenses.
In the case of Commissioner of Social Services of
Franklin County v. Bernard B., 637 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1995), a claim was made
that requiring an unwed father exclusively to make reimbursement to a social
service agency for birthing expenses constituted gender discrimination. The
court in that case rejected the argument based upon the following reasoning:
The
mother is eligible for Medicaid assistance in connection with her pregnancy
and birth-related costs as a direct recipient. Her eligibility for these benefits
is based on her medical condition of pregnancy, and under the applicable Medicaid
provisions, a recipient is protected against liability to the Department for
Medicaid benefits that were lawfully paid. . . . Thus,
the mother's condition of pregnancy provides the basis for her eligibility for
benefits and, at the same time, provides the basis for her immunity from recoupment.
The unwed father, on the other hand, because he is not pregnant and does not
give birth, is not a direct recipient of any medical assistance in connection
with his child's birth. . . .
Accordingly,
rather than gender, it is the physical condition of pregnancy that distinguishes
the unwed mother and father's statutory liability for the mother's birth-related
expenses. Because normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition
with unique characteristics, absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy
are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against members
of one sex or the other, a classification based on pregnancy does not constitute
a gender-based classification. . . . Thus, the difference in treatment
of fathers and mothers, which rests on the physical status of pregnancy,
is subject only to rational basis scrutiny.
We
conclude that a rational basis for the distinction exists. As was previously
discussed, the imposition of third-party liability on unwed fathers in this
context furthers the congressional policies underlying the Medicaid program.
Additionally, the Legislature could rationally determine that imposing the
threat of future liability on a medically indigent pregnant woman might discourage
her from obtaining medical care necessary for the health and survival of both
herself and the child, a consideration not applicable to the liability of
the unwed father. Because they are, thus, rationally related to a physical
distinction--pregnancy--the imposition of different standards of liability
with respect to medically indigent expectant mothers and fathers is not unconstitutional.
Bernard B., 637 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
(See footnote 7)
Mr. Carpenter additionally complains of the failure
and refusal of the lower tribunals to consider his ability to pay the reimbursement
sought. DHHR contends that neither the applicable statutes nor the case law
requires consideration of Mr. Carpenter's ability to pay reimbursement for birth
and medical expenses. Mr. Carpenter responds by arguing that the principles
applied in State ex rel. Department of Human Services by Adkins v. Huffman,
175 W. Va. 401, 332 S.E.2d 866 (1985), should be made applicable to the instant
case. We agree.
The decision in Huffman concerned whether or
not a biological father's ability to pay had to be considered when DHHR sought
reimbursement for AFDC benefits paid to a mother and her child. We concluded
in Syllabus point 2, in part, of Huffman that DHHR's right to reimbursement
for AFDC benefits “is dependent upon the ability of the responsible relative
to pay, and the determination of ability to pay must be made through an administrative
hearing or court proceeding.” 175 W. Va. 401, 332 S.E.2d 866.
In view of the foregoing, the circuit court's order
is affirmed to the extent that it requires Mr. Carpenter to be exclusively responsible
for reimbursement of Ms. Shephard's birth and medical expenses. However, the
order is reversed insofar as Mr. Carpenter was not afforded a hearing to determine
his ability to make such reimbursement. This case is further remanded for the purpose of holding an ability to pay hearing.
Affirmed, in part; Reversed, in part; and
Remanded.
During
the pendency of this appeal, the Legislature abolished the judicial office of
family law master and replaced it with the judicial office of family court judge.
See W. Va. Code § 51-2A-1, et seq.
At
the time of the underlying proceedings, the relevant statutory provision was
W. Va. Code § 48-2-15a(b). However, in 2001, the Legislature repealed
W. Va. Code § 48-2-15a(b) and reenacted it as W. Va. Code § 48-12-102.
Compare W. Va. Code § 48-2-15a(b) (1996) (Repl. Vol. 1996) with W. Va.
Code § 48-12-102 (2001) (Repl. Vol. 2001).
W.
Va. Code § 48-12-102 reads in full as follows: In every action to establish
or modify an order which requires the payment of child support, the court
shall ascertain the ability of each parent to provide medical care for the
children of the parties. In any temporary or final order establishing an award
of child support or any temporary or final order modifying a prior order establishing
an award of child support, the court shall order one or more of the following:
(1) The court shall order either
parent or both parents to provide insurance coverage for a child, if such insurance
coverage is available to that parent on a group basis through an employer, multiemployer
trust or through an employee's union. If similar insurance coverage is available
to both parents, the court shall order the child to be insured under the insurance
coverage which provides more comprehensive benefits. If such insurance coverage
is not available at the time of the entry of the order, the order shall require
that if such coverage thereafter becomes available to either party, that party
shall promptly notify the other party of the availability of insurance coverage
for the child.
(2) If the court finds that
insurance coverage is not available to either parent on a group basis through
an employer, multiemployer trust or employees' union, or that the group insurer
is not accessible to the parties, the court may order either parent or both
parents to obtain insurance coverage which is otherwise available at a reasonable
cost.
(3) Based upon the respective
ability of the parents to pay, the court may order either parent or both parents
to be liable for reasonable and necessary medical care for a child. The court
shall specify the proportion of the medical care for which each party shall
be responsible. If the amount of the award of child support in the order is
determined using the child support guidelines, the court shall order that nonrecurring
or subsequently occurring uninsured medical expenses in excess of two hundred
fifty dollars per year per child shall be separately divided between the parties
in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes.
(4) If insurance coverage is
available, the court shall also determine the amount of the annual deductible
on insurance coverage which is attributable to the children and designate the
proportion of the deductible which each party shall pay.
(5) The order shall require
the obligor to continue to provide the bureau for child support enforcement
with information as to his or her employer's name and address and information
as to the availability of employer-related insurance programs providing medical
care coverage so long as the child continues to be eligible to receive support.
We
wish to make clear that we are not holding that discrimination based on pregnancy
or other inherently gender-related characteristics is always to be considered
under a rational basis analysis. We recognize that in most cases where gender-based
classifications are linked to allegedly discriminatory practices, such classifications
are subject to mid-level equal protection scrutiny. See Syl. pt. 5, Israel
v. West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Com'n, 182 W. Va. 454, 388
S.E.2d 480 (1989) (“A gender-based classification challenged as denying
equal protection under Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution
can be upheld only if the classification serves
an important governmental objective and is substantially related to the
achievement of that objective.”).
Contrary
to the unsupported allegations in Mr. Carpenter's brief, DHHR has indicated
that when medical financial assistance is given to a pregnant woman who is married
and whose husband resides in the home, DHHR does not seek reimbursement
from the husband because a prior determination would have been made that
the entire family, including the husband, was indigent.
Alternatively, Mr. Carpenter has contended that, as
an unwed father, he is being discriminated against because DHHR did not take
into consideration his income status before awarding Ms. Shepard medical financial
assistance. DHHR has explained, and we concur, that paternity of an out of
wedlock child generally is not established until after a child is born. Consequently,
DHHR can only consider the income of the woman carrying the out of wedlock
child when providing such assistance.
We
will also note that, while DHHR did not draw the Court's attention to any applicable
federal law, our research revealed another, more fundamental basis for DHHR
not seeking reimbursement from Ms. Shepard. Federal law prohibits all states
from seeking recovery of medical assistance from a recipient, when the assistance
was properly paid from a Medicaid program funded partially by federal money.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(18) (1992); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (1992).
See also In re Paternity of N.L.M., 479 N.W.2d 237 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing
ruling that required mother to pay reimbursement for birth expenses).
Other
courts similarly have employed a rational basis analysis when reviewing classifications
involving the condition of pregnancy. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 94 S. Ct. 2485, 41 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1974), superseded by statute as stated
in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 103
S. Ct. 2622, 77 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1983); Kirkhuff v. Nimmo, 683 F.2d 544 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1992); Heath v. Westerville
Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Pocklington v. Duval County
Sch. Bd., 345 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
This
case subsequently was modified by the decision in Commissioner of Social Services
of Franklin County v. Bernard B., 637 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1995).
For cases holding biological fathers responsible for reimbursing Medicaid programs for birth expenses paid on behalf of their biological children, see generally Perry v. Dowling, 95 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Adoption of A.P.C., 776 So. 2d 567 (La. Ct. App. 2000), writ denied sub nom., In re Adoption of A.P.A., 785 So. 2d 835 (La. 2001); and Witt v. Seabrook, 210 Mich. App. 299, 533 N.W.2d 22 (1995).