2.    “In reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law of a circuit court supporting a civil contempt order, we apply a three-pronged standard of review. We review the contempt order under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review.” Syllabus point 1, Carter v. Carter, 196 W. Va. 239, 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996).

    3.    “Where the width of a right of way is not specified in the grant, nor determinable therefrom, the scope and purpose of the deed creating it, the situation and use of the property, and the intent of the parties will be considered, so as to provide a reasonable, safe and convenient way for the purposes for which it was intended.” Syllabus point 2, Palmer v. Newman, 91 W. Va. 13, 112 S.E. 194 (1922).

    4.    “A motion to vacate a judgment made pursuant to Rule 60(b), W. Va. R.C.P., is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court's ruling on such motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of an abuse of such discretion.” Syllabus point 5, Toler v. Shelton, 157 W. Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974).

    5.    “'Property' within the meaning of our Constitution against the taking or damaging of private property without just compensation paid or secured to be paid comprehends not only the thing possessed, but the right also to use and enjoy it, and every part of it, and in the case of real estate to the full limits of the boundary thereof.” Syllabus point 1, Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915), overruled on other grounds by Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).

    6.    “Wherefore any thing done by a state or its delegated agent, as a municipality, which substantially interferes with the beneficial use of land, depriving the owner of lawful dominion over it or any part of it, and not within the general police power of the state, is the taking or damaging of private property without compensation inhibited by the Constitution.” Syllabus point 2, Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915), overruled on other grounds by Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).

Per Curiam:

    This consolidated appeal arises from the September 19, 2000, order entered by the Circuit Court of Raleigh County. In that order, the lower court adopted a metes and bounds description for a right-of-way, the location and width of which has been repeatedly disputed by the owners of the servient estate, upon which the right-of-way is situate, and the dominant estate, which is accessed thereby. Despite the circuit court's attempts to fairly and accurately determine the boundaries of the right-of-way, both parties appealed from this order. Upon a review of the parties' arguments, the pertinent authorities, and the record submitted for appellate consideration, we affirm, in part, and vacate, in part the decision of the circuit court. Insofar as the circuit court adopted a metes and bounds description of the subject right-of-way, we affirm the circuit court's order. However, we vacate that portion of the circuit court's ruling which limited Mr. Stover's ability to erect markers on his property to denote the easement's borders.

    The circuit court, upon considering the matter without a jury, ruled, by order entered August 19, 1996, that

        [i]n the case at bar, there is no precise width to the right of way granted. The court observes that the use of the subject right of way has been established since 1950. The significant change to usage has been the activity of the plaintiff [Mr. Stover] in putting large posts on the inside of the subject curve, and laying logs on the outside of the curve, which have the sole purpose of restricting the use of the right of way by making passage more difficult. There is no question, based upon the court's inspection, that such posts and logs inhibit travel over the easement by making it exceedingly difficult to negotiate.

         Accordingly, the court is of the opinion to and doth ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE as follows:

    1.    That the defendant [Mr. Milam] be permanently enjoined from doing any act to further increase the width, curvature and/or location of the subject right of way or easement as it presently extends over, across and through the subject real estate owned by plaintiff, situate near Harper, Trap Hill District, Raleigh County, West Virginia.

    2.    That the plaintiff be directed and hereby required to remove forthwith the large posts on the inside of the curve and the logs on the outside of said curve to the right of way or easement which is the subject of this dispute.

    3.    That upon removal of the aforesaid posts and logs, the subject right of way or easement shall become fixed and determined as to its properly used width, curvature and location, according to law. . . .
Following this ruling, Mr. Milam appealed to this Court for relief from the circuit court's judgment. This Court rejected the appeal by order entered September 3, 1997.

    Thereafter, on October 2, 1997, Mr. Stover petitioned the circuit court to find Mr. Milam in contempt of court for widening the aforementioned right-of-way in violation of the circuit court's August, 1996, order. By order entered August 3, 1998, the court denied Mr. Stover's petition and determined that Mr. Milam was not in contempt. In support of this ruling, the circuit court found that “there will unavoidably be some slight alterations caused by weather and use over time and that any alterations to the roadway which have occurred as of the date of the hearing were due to proper usage of the subject easement within the contemplation of the Court's original Order.” The court further warned Mr. Milam to refrain from intentionally widening the right-of-way and precluded Mr. Stover from “installing railroad ties, posts or other impediments which would be artifices designed to restrict travel over the roadway.”

    In response to the circuit court's order, Mr. Stover filed motions pursuant to Rules 59(e)   (See footnote 3)  and 60(b)(5)   (See footnote 4)  of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure on August 4, 1998. Through these motions, Mr. Stover sought to alter or amend the circuit court's contempt order by requesting the court to adopt a more definite description of the property in question so that each party would know the precise boundaries of the right-of-way. Mr. Stover additionally sought relief from the court's contempt order of August 3, 1998, as well as from its original order on the merits, entered August 19, 1996, to permit him to “place posts, fences and/or plants on his property, not to impede or inhibit travel over the roadway but to clearly mark and define where his ownership rights begin and where [Mr. Milam's] usage rights of the roadway end.”

    By order entered September 19, 2000, the circuit court granted, in part, Mr. Stover's motions. In this regard, the court adopted the results of an August, 1996, survey, that was later revised in May, 1997,   (See footnote 5)  and determined that the right-of-way's metes and bounds description should correspond with the revised survey calculations to include that property referred to as “additional road width”.   (See footnote 6)  The court further ordered that

    1.    The configuration of the roadway in question is hereby fixed as it portrayed and shaded in red on that map attached hereto as “Exhibit A” [reflecting the revised survey results] and made a part of this order by express reference thereto.

    2.    Plaintiff [Mr. Stover] shall be permitted to install three wooden poles or three iron bars spaced approximately ten (10) feet apart on the outside edge of the curve of this roadway, if and only if these conditions are met:

        A.    Plaintiff retains at his expense a licensed surveyor to revise the existing map attached hereto as “Exhibit A” to show the exact measurements of the roadway shaded in red (at appropriate points);

        B.    Plaintiff is assisted in the placement of the three wooden poles or iron bars as aforesaid by a licensed surveyor who will ensure that such poles or bars are properly placed on the outside edge of such curve.

    3.    Plaintiff is hereby prohibited from placing or installing any logs, poles, bars, boards, fences or other obstructions of any kind on or near the edges of the subject roadway, except as heretofore provided, so that there will be no unreasonable impediment to the lawful and free use of such easement by the defendant [Mr. Milam].

    4.    Defendant shall be permanently enjoined from doing any act to further increase the width, curvature and/or location of the subject right-of-way or easement as it is portrayed on that map attached hereto as “Exhibit A”[.]

From this order of the circuit court, both Mr. Stover and Mr. Milam appeal to this Court.

    When reviewing a circuit court's order concerning a Rule 59(e) motion, we typically apply the standard of review applicable to the underlying judgment that the motion seeks to alter or amend.

        The standard of review applicable to an appeal from a motion to alter or amend a judgment, made pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the same standard that would apply to the underlying judgment upon which the motion is based and from which the appeal to this Court is filed.

Syl. pt. 1, Wickland v. American Travellers Life Ins. Co., 204 W. Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998). Thus, since the judgment underlying Mr. Stover's Rule 59(e) motion is the court's August, 1998, order refusing to hold Mr. Milam in contempt, we apply the standard of review applicable to such a proceeding:

        In reviewing the findings of fact and conclusions of law of a circuit court supporting a civil contempt order, we apply a three-pronged standard of review. We review the contempt order under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. pt. 1, Carter v. Carter, 196 W. Va. 239, 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996).

    Having established the pertinent standard of review, we now consider the parties' arguments. Viewed collectively, the errors assigned by the parties regarding the circuit court's Rule 59(e) ruling all pertain to that tribunal's fixation of the easement's boundaries and its treatment of the evidence submitted by the litigants with respect thereto. The crux of this controversy stems from the fact that the deed creating this right-of-way did not provide definite boundary lines therefor.   (See footnote 9) 

    In prior cases involving similar boundary disputes, we have held that

        [w]here the width of a right of way is not specified in the grant, nor determinable therefrom, the scope and purpose of the deed creating it, the situation and use of the property, and the intent of the parties will be considered, so as to provide a reasonable, safe and convenient way for the purposes for which it was intended.

Syl. pt. 2, Palmer v. Newman, 91 W. Va. 13, 112 S.E. 194 (1922). See also Jenkins v. Johnson, 181 W. Va. 281, 284-85, 382 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1989) (per curiam) (“Where there is no precise width to an express right-of-way, we have adopted the view that the actual use made will control.” (citations omitted)). Cf. Syl. pt. 1, Hoffman v. Smith, 172 W. Va. 698, 310 S.E.2d 216 (1983) (“Where one acquires an easement over the property of another by an express grant, the use of that easement must be confined to the terms and purposes of the grant.”). Upon a review of the circuit court's ruling adopting the metes and bounds description contained in its September, 2000, order, we cannot find that the court either misapplied the applicable law or clearly erred in rendering its findings of fact. See Syl. pt. 1, Carter v. Carter, 196 W. Va. 239, 470 S.E.2d 193. In fact, the record presented for our consideration indicates that the circuit court properly and thoroughly considered the property's historical use, the deed granting the same, the safety of the involved roadway, the various survey and expert evidence, and the actual right-of-way, itself,   (See footnote 10)  in adopting the metes and bounds description contained in its September 19, 2000, order. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the circuit court's ruling whereby it granted Mr. Stover's Rule 59(e) motion and adopted a metes and bounds description of the right-of-way at issue herein.

    In his motion to the circuit court pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure,   (See footnote 12)  Mr. Stover requested the circuit court to set aside that portion of its prior orders to permit him to “place posts, fences and/or plants on his property, not to impede or inhibit travel over the roadway but to clearly mark and define where his ownership rights begin and where [Mr. Milam's] usage rights of the roadway end.” Ruling upon Mr. Stover's motion, the circuit court, by order entered September 19, 2000, observed that it was somewhat ambivalent regarding the placement of poles, fences and other obstructions along the edge of the right-of-way. In keeping with prior rulings, the court abhors the intentional obstruction of lawful and free passage along any roadway. But on the other hand, without some guard to prevent future encroachment, and a measuring stick to determine if the roadway has actually been expanded, the court is fearful that we will continue to rehash this matter again and again in future proceedings. Thus, a compromise is in order. The placement of some poles or bars will be permitted as hereinafter set forth.

This “permission” was then phrased in the court's final mandate as follows:

    Plaintiff [Mr. Stover] shall be permitted to install three wooden poles or three iron bars spaced approximately ten (10) feet apart on the outside edge of the curve of this roadway, if and only if these conditions are met:

        A.    Plaintiff retains at his expense a licensed surveyor to revise the existing map attached hereto as “Exhibit A” to show the exact measurements of the roadway shaded in red (at appropriate points);

        B.    Plaintiff is assisted in the placement of the three wooden poles or iron bars as aforesaid by a licensed surveyor who will ensure that such poles or bars are properly placed on the outside edge of such curve.

    Plaintiff is hereby prohibited from placing or installing any logs, poles, bars, boards, fences or other obstructions of any kind on or near the edges of the subject roadway, except as heretofore provided, so that there will be no unreasonable impediment to the lawful and free use of such easement by the defendant [Mr. Milam].

On appeal to this Court, Mr. Stover reiterates his complaint that he be allowed to use his property as he desires so long as he refrains from impinging upon Mr. Milam's right to use the subject easement.

    Typically, this Court accords broad discretion to a circuit court deciding a Rule 60(b) motion. “A motion to vacate a judgment made pursuant to Rule 60(b), W. Va. R.C.P., is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and the court's ruling on such motion will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a showing of an abuse of such discretion.” Syl. pt. 5, Toler v. Shelton, 157 W. Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974). Here, however, we conclude that the circuit court has abused its discretion.

    While we appreciate the circuit court's extreme frustration with the parties in this case and their persistent dispute which the court had, on numerous occasions, attempted to fairly and equitably resolve once and for all,   (See footnote 13)  there simply is no authority to support the continued restriction of Mr. Stover's use of his own property. In fact, insofar as the circuit court's ruling adversely affects Mr. Stover's property rights, the law clearly provides that he may, in fact, use his property as he sees fit, as long as he does not impinge upon Mr. Milam's right to use the easement at the heart of this controversy.

    According to the Constitution of this State, “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers.” W. Va. Const. art. III, § 10. Accord U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This protection is afforded to “any significant property interest,” Don S. Co., Inc. v. Roach, 168 W. Va. 605, 610, 285 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1981) (citations omitted), and includes not only the actual physical possession of property but the right to use the same.

        “Property” within the meaning of our Constitution against the taking or damaging of private property without just compensation paid or secured to be paid comprehends not only the thing possessed, but the right also to use and enjoy it, and every part of it, and in the case of real estate to the full limits of the boundary thereof.

Syl. pt. 1, Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1915), overruled on other grounds by Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960). Because this constitutional protection prohibits the encumbrance of one's property absent sufficient justification,

        [w]herefore any thing done by a state or its delegated agent, as a municipality, which substantially interferes with the beneficial use of land, depriving the owner of lawful dominion over it or any part of it, and not within the general police power of the state, is the taking or damaging of private property without compensation inhibited by the Constitution.

Syl. pt. 2, Fruth, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105. See also Syl. pt. 2, Lovett v. West Virginia Cent. Gas Co., 65 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E. 196 (1909) (“The impairment of the utility of one's property by the direct invasion of his private domain is a taking of his property, within the constitutional meaning, though the owner has not less of material things than he had before.”).

    Based upon these principles, we can reach no conclusion other than that Mr. Stover should be permitted to erect markers on his property to denote the boundary lines of the right-of-way if he so chooses. Accordingly, the circuit court's ruling to the contrary is hereby vacated. We cannot emphasize enough, however, that Mr. Stover should exercise the utmost caution in constructing such border markings in order to ensure that Mr. Milam's right to use the easement is not adversely affected. In rendering this decision, we wish finally to observe that we believe the circuit court acted with no ill will towards the parties herein and did not possess a malicious intent when it imposed this unlawful restriction upon Mr. Stover. Rather, our review of the record suggests that the circuit court was merely striving to achieve the laudable goal of judicial economy by attempting to definitively resolve this very contentious dispute.

                        Affirmed, in part, and Vacated, in part.

    Received of J.M. Lafferty the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and other consideration not hereinafter mentioned, in consideration of which Morris Stover and Florence Stover, his wife, do hereby grant and convey unto said J.W. [sic] Lafferty, his heirs and assigns, the right and easement to construct and use and maintain a roadway for horses, cars, trucks and the like as semi-public way from the land of said J.M. Lafferty on and over our land, situate in the Trap Hill District, County of Raleigh, and State of West Virginia and bounded:

        On the North by the Bill Willard Property

        On the East by the said J.M. Lafferty Property

        On the South by the Herbert Harper Property

        On the West by the Railroad

    to and from and over said premises to the public highway.