McGraw, C.J., dissenting: While the majority in this
case presents a compelling argument in favor of the repeal or modification
of W. Va. Code § 17A-4A-14, the fact remains that the Legislature
has not seen fit to take such action, and I simply fail to discern an intent
in either the text or history of the counterposed W. Va. Code § 46-9-301(2)
to abrogate this more specific statute. As the majority recognizes
then quickly ignores, “[r]epeal of a statute by implication is not favored
in law.” Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. City of Wheeling v. Renick,
145 W. Va. 640, 116 S.E.2d 763 (1960). In most circumstances, where two
statutes, one general and the other more specific, conflict, the specific
statute is deemed to be an exception to the more general legislation. See
Syl. pt. 1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon, 174 W. Va. 330, 325
S.E.2d 120 (1984) (“The general rule of statutory construction requires
that a specific statute be given precedence over a general statute relating
to the same subject matter where the two cannot be reconciled.”). In
this case § 17A-4A-14 is more specific than § 46-9-301(2),
since it pertains to certificates of title in the limited context of automobiles.
One respected treatise states that
[w]here one statute deals with
a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject
in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there
is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed
prior to the general statute, unless it appears that the legislature intended
to make the general act controlling. As to whether the legislature
has signaled an intent to impliedly repeal a specific statute through the
adoption of a more general law, this Court stated in syllabus point 2 of Trumka
v. Clerk of the Circuit Court of Mingo County, 175 W. Va. 371, 332
S.E.2d 826 (1985): I simply fail to discern
a conflict “so real and irreconcilable as to indicate a clear legislative
purpose to repeal [§ 17A-4A-14].” By departing from the more
forgiving provisions of the UCC, the Legislature may just as conceivably have
intended that the rigid 30-day period imposed by § 17A-4A-14 should promote compliance
with other regulatory and taxing requirements linked to automobile titling
and registration. See, e.g., 1957 W. Va. Acts, Reg. Sess. ch.
110 (requiring proof of payment of personal property taxes as prerequisite
for vehicle registration) (codified as amended at W. Va. Code 17A-3-3a
(2001)); 1951 W. Va. Acts, Reg. Sess. ch. 129, art. 3, § 4
(imposing two-percent privilege tax on obtaining certificate of title) (codified
as amended at W. Va. Code § 17A-3-4(b) (2000)). Thus, in my view the majority
in this case erred by finding that § 17A-4A-14 was impliedly repealed
by the adoption of the UCC. I therefore respectfully dissent.
2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.05,
at 244 (6th ed. 2000) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
“'A
general statute, which does not use express terms or employ words which manifest
a plain intention so to do, will not repeal a former statute dealing with
a particular subject, and the two statutes will operate together unless the
conflict between them is so real and irreconcilable as to indicate a clear
legislative purpose to repeal the former statute.' Point 6, syllabus,
Harbert v. The County Court of Harrison County, 129 W. Va. 54
[39 S.E.2d 177 (1946) ].” Syllabus Point 1, Brown v. Civil Service
Comm'n, 155 W. Va. 657, 186 S.E.2d 840 (1972).
See also syl. pt. 7, Rice v. Underwood, 205 W. Va.
274, 517 S.E.2d 751 (1998).